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Admiralty Law. Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 135
(D. R.I. 2004). The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act
of 19881 provides protection for seamen leaving port on boats
twenty tons or larger by requiring that the terms of the fishing
voyage, including the method of compensation, be reduced to indi-
vidual writings between the vessel owner and each fisherman
prior to the vessel leaving port. These agreements must be signed
by the owner of the vessel, must state the period of effectiveness of
the agreement, and must include terms of wages or another com-
pensatory scheme particular to the fishery being utilized. En-
gagements between seamen and vessels not complying with these
statutory agreement guidelines are void, and seamen may leave
the service of the vessel at any time and are entitled to recover de-
fault wages at the highest rate particular to the port from which
the vessel was engaged.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The two defendants, vessel owning corporations Huntress,
Inc. and Relentless, Inc., employed the five plaintiff fishermen as
crew at various times between 1993 and 2000 aboard the fishing
vessels Persistence and Relentless.2 These vessels both weighed
greater than twenty gross tons, and were based in Davisville,
Rhode Island.3 The defendants routinely compensated crewmen
with the "lay-share system," where the crewmen would engage in
commercial fishing aboard the vessels and would return to port
and sell the fish for profit.4 After selling the fish, Defendants
would deduct fishing expenses, and normally about sixty percent
of the net profits would go to the vessel owner, while the remain-
ing forty percent would be divided "among the crewmen in the
form of 'shares.'" 5
1. Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 10601
(1988).
2. Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D. R.I. 2004).
3. Id. at 137.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 138.
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The details of these shares are important to the case. After
each fishing trip, the vessel's captain would apportion a share of
the remaining net profits to the crewmen based on the crewman's
performance on the voyage.6 Because a crewman's share was not
based upon bargaining or an agreement with the defendants or
the vessel captains before leaving port,7 vessel captains allocated
shares based on their discretion only. Generally, more experienced
fishermen were paid larger shares than less experienced fisher-
men.8 After the captain made his calculations, the defendants
would issue checks to crewmen accordingly.9 Crewmen were nei-
ther informed of the final accounting of the trip, nor were they in-
formed what percentage share they received as compared to the
other fishermen on the same vessel.10
Normally, these "lay-share" agreements were oral only, and
not reduced to writing."1 Sometimes, crewmen would sign a
"FISHING AGREEMENT" as required by federal law, but these
agreements only referenced payment by saying that each "crew-
member shall receive a share of the crew's net proceeds from the
trip."12 Other versions of the agreements would be signed by
crewmembers prior to departure, and the amount of the crew-
man's payment share would purposely be left blank, to be deter-
mined after the trip.13 None of the defendants' authorized agents
ever personally signed these agreements.14 The only other agree-
ments normally signed by crewmen prior to departure were ros-
ters designed to keep track of the crewmen on each vessel. The
crewman's signature on these rosters was also an agreement to
the "terms and conditions of the fishing agreement" for that par-
ticular vessel. 15
Each of the five plaintiffs made numerous trips aboard the
two vessels Persistence and Relentless over the seven-year pe-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. There was no formula followed by captains in deciding share size.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 138-39.
15. Id. at 139.
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riod. 16 No one ever signed a pre-voyage agreement delineating the
terms of compensation.17
Finally, in 2000, Plaintiffs' attorney realized that defendants
paid crewmembers "differing amounts per trip for the same work,
and that no written agreements were executed prior to embarka-
tion" documenting each crewmember's wage or share.18 Plaintiffs
claimed they never realized they were paid different shares for the
same employment aboard the two vessels. 19 Subsequently, the
plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants for violations of the
Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 ("the Act")
that occurred from 1993-2000.20
Plaintiffs' sole claims are under sections 10601 and 11107 of
the Act. The defendants raise the defenses of waiver and laches.
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because: (1)
Defendants failed to comply with section 1060121 which "requires
a written contract between working fishermen and those in charge
of the vessel" to be executed before leaving port;22 and (2) Plain-
tiffs correctly asserted section 1110723 as the unambiguous statu-
tory remedy for violations of section 10601 against lay-share
fishermen.24 No dispute as to any of material fact existed regard-
ing either of these issues, thus summary judgment was appropri-
ate.25 Meanwhile, the court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the defense issues of waiver and laches be-
cause a genuine issue of material fact existed to be determined by
the factfinder.26
16. Id.
17. See id. at 137-39.
18. Id. at 139-40.
19. Id. at 140.
20. Id.
21. Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 10601
(1988).
22. Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
23. 46 U.S.C. § 11107.
24. Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
25. Id. at 141.
26. Id. at 149.
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First, in determining that the defendants had failed to comply
with section 10601,27 the court looked to the plain statutory lan-
guage of the provision to determine statutory construction. 28 The
court concluded that section 10601 required owners and operators
of fishing vessels greater than twenty tons to enter written
agreements with each crewman, and to include the necessary par-
ties, timing, and terms in the agreement.29 The court declined to
accept Defendants' argument that the Act does not preclude the
traditional oral contracts used for hundreds of years in the fishing
industry because section 10601 uses the mandatory term "shall,"
eliminating the defendants' argument. 30 Congress acted to change
admiralty law to protect crewmen.31 This interpretation of section
10601 fosters bargaining between fishermen and the captain re-
garding a fisherman's share of the profits, and protects fishermen
from discrimination by the captain in determining shares. 32 There-
fore, the oral agreements between the Defendants and Plaintiff
fishermen between 1993 and 2000, as well as the generic "share"
agreements and roster sheets lacking important compensation
terms, all failed to satisfy the clear requirements of section
10601. 33 The agreements never even mentioned how the lay-share
system worked. 34 Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
27. 46 U.S.C. § 10601. The statute states, in relevant part:
(a) Before proceeding on a voyage, the owner, charterer, or managing
operator, or a representative thereof, including the master or indi-
vidual in charge, of a fishing vessel, fish processing vessel, or fish
tender vessel shall make a fishing agreement in writing with each
seaman employed on board if the vessel is - (1) at least 20 gross tons
as measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate ton-
nage measured under section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the
Secretary under section 14104 of this title; and (2) on a voyage from
a port in the United States.
(b) The agreement shall - (1) state the period of effectiveness of the
agreement; (2) include the terms of any wage, share, or other com-
pensation arrangement peculiar to the fishery in which the vessel
will be engaged during the period of the agreement; and (3) include
other agreed terms.
Id.
28. Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
29. Id.; see supra note 27.
30. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 144.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 145.
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ment on the issue of Defendants' violation of section 10601 was
granted.
Second, Plaintiffs properly cited section 1110735 as the proper
statutory remedy for violations of section 10601.36 Statutory con-
struction of section 11107 plainly revealed that "an engagement of
a seaman contrary to a law of the United States is void."37 The
court found it immaterial that section 11107 referred to "seamen"
while Plaintiffs were "fishermen."38 Section 11107 is "both a 'pen-
alty' placed on vessel owners for lack of compliance with admiralty
laws and as a 'statutory default to market wage' when a contract
is contrary to law... ."39 Defendants are free to continue to pay
experienced crewmen more money, as long as such agreements are
reduced to writing prior to leaving port.40 Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment on the issue of requiring Defendants to adhere
to the statutory remedy of section 11107 for violations of section
10601 was granted.
Defendants cross-motioned for summary judgment on the is-
sue of waiver as a defense; that "by accepting payment for their
services, Plaintiffs waived their right" to contest payment by De-
fendants. 41 However, waiver only applies if the waiving party does
so knowingly.42 Here, because the undisputed facts failed to show
that Plaintiffs knew about problems with Defendants' payment,
summary judgment was inappropriate on the defense of waiver.43
Also, Defendants cross-motioned for summary judgment on
35. 46 U.S.C. § 11107 (1988):
An engagement of a seaman contrary to a law of the United States is
void. A seaman so engaged may leave the service of the vessel at any
time and is entitled to recover the highest rate of wages at the port
from which the seaman was engaged or the amount agreed to be
given the seaman at the time of engagement, whichever is higher.
Id.
36. Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.
37. Id. at 146 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 11107.
38. Id. at 146.
39. Id. at 148 (quoting Harper v. United States Seafoods LP, 278 F.3d
971, 977 (9th Cir. 2002)).
40. Id. However, both this court as well as the Ninth Circuit refused to
award aggrieved crewmen the highest possible rate paid to anyone on the
ship (usually the captain), but allowed that crewman may be paid more than
they would have had they not brought this lawsuit. Id.
41. Id. at 149.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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the issue of laches, asserting that Plaintiffs' claim was barred in
any regard because they unreasonably delayed bringing the suit,
and the delay resulted in prejudice for the Defendants." The
Court applied a ten-year statute of limitations based on Rhode Is-
land General Laws section 9-1-13(a) applicable to claims for un-
paid statutory wages.45 Because undisputed facts failed to show
that Plaintiffs "delayed unreasonably in bringing suit," or that the
delay prejudiced Defendants, summary judgment was inappropri-
ate on the defense of laches. 46
COMMENTARY
Doyle changes the practice of lay-share fishing agreements
that existed among fishermen for "hundreds of years."47 The
court's application of sections 10601 and 11107 to the facts of
Doyle is consistent with similar decisions in both the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals as well as the Alaska Supreme Court, the only
other courts to decide the issue.48 The decision in Doyle allows
commercial fishing vessel crewmen, of which there are many leav-
ing from New England ports, to engage in pre-voyage bargaining
with captains and boat owners about the value of their work on
the vessel. 49 Less experienced crewmen aboard commercial fishing
vessels are likely to be unfamiliar with the legal guidelines sur-
rounding their compensation and are also more likely to feel pow-
erless to bargain with vessel owners or captains for fear that they
would simply be replaced by other crewmen. By requiring a pre-
voyage agreement signed by all relevant parties, crewmen are
provided protection from "arbitrary discrimination" by vessel cap-
tains in apportioning crewmen's shares.50
However, the holding in Doyle might not necessarily mean
44. Id.
,15. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(a) (Supp. 2004).
46. Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
47. Id. at 143.
48. Id. at 146 (citing Flores v. Amercian Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 912(9th Cir. 2003)); Harper v. U.S. Seafoods LP, 278 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.
2002); TCW Special Credits v. Chloe Z Fishing Co., Inc., 129 F.3d 1330, 1333
(9th Cir. 1997); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Conway, 98 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1996); Bjornsson v. U.S. Dominator, Inc., 863 P.2d 235, 238-39 (Alaska
1993).
49. See Doyle, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
50. See id.
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that the lay-share system cannot be used by vessel owners. The
court hinted that agreements might be sufficient under section
10601 if they included essential terms such as who determines the
crewmen's shares, factors to be used by the decision-maker, the
timing of such a decision or an overall policy of compensating ex-
perienced crewmen more generously. 51 This language may suggest
that the general lay-share scheme could be retained, as long as the
share-determining process is well explained in the pre-voyage
agreements signed by both the crewmen and either the vessel
owners or captain. Either way, the decision in Doyle will hold ves-
sel owners and captains accountable for their compensation deci-
sions.
CONCLUSION
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land held it insufficient for commercial fishing vessel owners and
captains of vessels over twenty tons to leave port without specific,
written agreements with each crewman on board for any particu-
lar trip. The previous oral lay-share agreement system did not
comply with the requirements of the Commercial Fishing Industry
Vessel Safety Act of 1988. However, the court stopped short of re-
quiring that pre-voyage written agreements delineate the specific
percentage shares of fish sale profits to be due each crewman upon
return to port. Even without requiring a written agreement to
specific percentage shares for each crewman, the court provided
crewmen protection from arbitrary or discriminatory decisions of
vessel captains in apportioning funds, and allowed crewmen to
now make informed decisions when committing to work aboard
commercial vessels.
Joseph Farside
51. See id. at 145.
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Civil Procedure. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee v.
Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008 (R.I. 2004). A judicially confirmed
arbitration award is a final judgment for purposes of collateral es-
toppel.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 14, 1999, Michael Bailey was terminated as a
physical education teacher at Ponaganset High School for alleged
inappropriate behavior with female students.1 Bailey subse-
quently appealed his termination to arbitration. 2 On April 10,
2001, the arbitrator issued his decision, stating that there was
"clear and convincing evidence that Bailey's actions were 'inap-
propriate for a teacher' and that the school committee had just
cause to terminate his employment."3 The Rhode Island Superior
Court confirmed the arbitration award on October 12, 2001. 4
During the arbitration proceedings, Bailey filed for unem-
ployment benefits.5 On February 27, 2001, the director of the
Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training granted Bailey's
request, finding that he had been "discharged under 'non-
disqualifying circumstances." 6 After appealing the director's deci-
sion to a referee of the Board of Review (Board), the school com-
mittee appealed to the Board.7 On April 25, 2001, the Board held a
de novo hearing, which resulted in the Board sustaining the direc-
tor's decision that Bailey had been terminated for non-
disqualifying conduct.8 The school committee then appealed to the
district court, arguing, inter alia, that the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel should have precluded the Board from making any findings
of fact because the same issue of fact had already been decided by
1. Foster-Glocester Reg'l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854 A.2d 1008,
1011 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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the arbitrator. 9 The district court held that, "because the arbitra-
tion decision had not been confirmed at the time when the Board
issued its decision" the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inappli-
cable.'0
BACKGROUND
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that "an issue of
ultimate fact that has been actually litigated and determined can-
not be re-litigated between the same parties or their privies in fu-
ture proceedings."" Generally, courts should apply the doctrine
when the following three elements are satisfied: (1) the parties are
the same or in privity with the parties of the previous proceeding;
(2) a final judgment on the merits has been entered in the previ-
ous proceeding; and (3) the issue or issues in question are identi-
cal in both proceedings. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In this case, the superior court confirmed the arbitration
award on October 12, 2001; however, the Board issued its decision
on May 2, 2001.13 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted
preliminarily that because the Board issued its decision "well be-
fore" the superior court's confirmation of the arbitration award, 4
the Board was not precluded from finding that Bailey's termina-
tion had been under non-disqualifying circumstances. 5 The court
held, however, that the district court erred in its decision because
all three elements of collateral estoppel had been satisfied by the
time the case had reached the district court.'6
1. Same Parties
The court held that the parties to the arbitration proceedings
and the unemployment-compensation proceedings were the same
parties. While the parties to the unemployment compensation
9. See id. at 1012.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1014 (quoting George v. Fadiani 772 A.2d 1065, 1067 (R.I.
2001) (internal quotations omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1014.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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hearing were the school committee and Bailey, the parties to the
arbitration hearing were the school committee and Bailey's labor
union;17 however, the labor union had represented Bailey's inter-
ests at the arbitration hearings.'8 Additionally, the court rea-
soned, "an attorney represented Bailey as his personal counsel at
the hearings. Thus, the arbitration provided Bailey ample oppor-
tunity in a judicial-type proceeding to challenge the school com-
mittee's evidence that supported his termination for alleged
misconduct."19
2. Final Judgment
The court held the superior court's judgment confirming the
arbitration award to be a final judgment. In Graziano v. R. I. State
Lottery Comm'n,20 the court gave res judicata effect to a federal
district court judgment that became final after the First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed it while an identical action was pending
before the Rhode Island Supreme Court.21 The Graziano Court
held that "even though 'the defense of res adjudicata could not be
raised in the Superior Court,' it was 'properly raised before this
Court since the federal judgment became final while these issues
were pending on appeal before us.'"
22
Applying the holding in Graziano to the present case, the
court held that because no party had appealed the superior court's
judgment confirming the arbitration award, it had ripened into a
final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. 23 Therefore, just as
the prior judgment in Graziano became final while that action was
pending before the supreme court, the superior court's judgment
in this case confirming the arbitration award became final while
this action was pending before the district court.
24
3. Same Issue
The court held that the issues determined by the Board and
17. Id. at 1015 n.3.
18. Id. at 1015.
19. Id.
20. 810 A.2d 215 (R.I. 2002).
21. Foster-Glocester, 854 A.2d at 1015.
22. Id. (quoting Graziano, 810 A.2d at 220-21).
23. Id. (citing Mulholland Constr. Co. v. Lee Pare & Assocs., Inc., 576
A.2d 1236, 1237 (R.I. 1990)).
24. Id.
83920051
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the arbitrator were the same.25 The arbitrator found by "clear and
convincing evidence that [Bailey] did what the witnesses de-
scribed... and that those actions were inappropriate for a
teacher"26 amounting to "proved misconduct."27 Similarly, the
Board, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 28-44-18,
had to determine whether Bailey's behavior amounted to "proved
misconduct."28 Because the Board had to determine what had al-
ready been determined by the arbitrator, the court held that the
district court should have applied the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel and vacated the Board's findings on the identical issue of Bai-
ley's conduct.29
COMMENTARY
Although the Restatement provides generally that "a valid
and final award by arbitration has the same effects under the
rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifica-
tions, as a judgment of a court,"30 an important caveat is provided
in comment c: "Giving claim preclusive effect to an arbitration
award does not necessarily imply that such an award should also
be given issue preclusive effects."31 The Restatement favors deny-
ing collateral estoppel effect to findings achieved through "very in-
formal" arbitration proceedings;32 however, "[w]hen arbitration
affords opportunity for presentation of evidence and argument
substantially similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings, the
award should have the same effect on issues necessarily deter-
mined as a judgment has."33
An appropriate arbitration procedure favoring collateral es-
toppel might include: "formal statement of charges, presentation
of evidence through oral examination as in court, assistance of
counsel, and a formal deliberative process by the arbitrator."3 In
this case, the arbitrator was a lawyer who conducted the arbitra-
25. Id. at 1016.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1016-17.
29. Id. at 1017.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982).
31. Id. § 84 cmt. c.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 84 cmt. c, illus. 4.
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tion according to the rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion;35 Bailey's interests were represented by a lawyer from his la-
bor union as well as his own personal counsel;36 direct and cross-
examination of witnesses was conducted;37 and the arbitrator ap-
plied a clear standard of proof - clear and convincing evidence.
38
Given the formal nature of the arbitration proceedings, affording
the arbitration award collateral estoppel effect was entirely con-
sistent with the Restatement in that respect.
Additionally, the court's attributing collateral estoppel effect
to the arbitration award, confirmed by the superior court while
the unemployment-compensation proceeding was pending, is con-
sistent with the Restatement: "If two actions which involve the
same issue are pending between the same parties, it is the first fi-
nal judgment rendered in one of those actions which becomes con-
clusive in the other action, regardless of which action was brought
first."39 Section 14 comment a clarifies that "[i]n order that a final
judgment shall be given res judicata effect in a pending action, it
is not required that the judgment shall have been rendered before
that [pending] action was commenced." 40 Although the arbitration
award became a final judgment after the unemployment-
compensation proceedings had commenced and were pending, it
was nevertheless appropriately given collateral estoppel effect
over the latter action.
CONCLUSION
The district court should have applied the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel to the unemployment-compensation case pending be-
fore it because the earlier arbitration award, confirmed by the
superior court, was a final judgment to which collateral estoppel
effect should have been given.
Aaron R. Baker
35. Foster-Glocester, 854 A.2d at 1015.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1016.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. 1 (1982).
40. Id. § 14 cmt. a.
20051

Constitutional Law. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
(Casino), 856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004). At the request of Governor
Donald L. Carcieri, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an
advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of the 2004 Ca-
sino Act and the related referendum question on building a gam-
bling casino in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The court stated that
the important constitutional and social questions raised by the
governor's question represented sufficiently appropriate circum-
stances for the court to speak on the subject. After an examination
of the Rhode Island constitutional requirement that all lotteries be
operated by the state, the court concluded that the Casino Act was
unconstitutional and that the General Assembly could not submit
a referendum question regarding the casino to the state's voters.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Supreme Court delivered this advisory
opinion in the midst of the controversy surrounding the proposed
2004 referendum question regarding the building of a casino in
West Warwick. After both houses of the General Assembly passed
a bill entitled The Rhode Island Gaming Control and Revenue Act
(Casino Act),' Governor Carcieri veto6d the bill. 2 The Casino Act
included a provision calling for the following statewide referen-
dum: "Shall there be a casino in the Town of West Warwick oper-
ated by an Affiliate of Harrah's Entertainment in association with
the Narragansett Indian Tribe?"3 Governor Carcieri, concerned
that both the referendum question violated the Rhode Island Con-
stitution's ban on lotteries run by entities other than the state
4
and that the General Assembly would override his veto, submitted
a request to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for its opinion on
1. R.I. GEN. LAws § 41-9.1-1 (Supp. 2004).
2. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320, 322-
23 (R.I. 2004).
3. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
4. R.I. CONST. art VI, § 15 ("All lotteries shall be prohibited in the state
except lotteries operated by the state and except those previously permitted
by the general assembly prior to the adoption of this section, and shall be
subject to the prescription and regulation of the general assembly.").
843
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the constitutionality of the Casino Act. 5
As expected, the General Assembly overrode the veto.6 Gover-
nor Carcieri and Attorney General Patrick Lynch subsequently
filed briefs in opposition to the Casino Act, arguing that it was un-
constitutional. 7 Both the Speaker of the Rhode Island House of
Representatives and the Senate President filed briefs in support of
the legislation.8 Casino supporters Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.
and the Narragansett Indian Tribe, as well as casino opponents
Lincoln Park, Inc., Newport Grand Jai Alai, LLC, and The Greater
Providence Chamber of Commerce filed amicus curiae briefs on
opposing sides of the issue. 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Before issuing this advisory opinion, 0 the supreme court de-
scribed how an advisory opinion differs from a typical judicial de-
cision. At the outset of its advisory opinion, the court reiterated its
role as consultative and "somewhat like the juriconsults under the
Roman law."" As a group of legal consultants rather than deci-
sion-makers, the court could not (and did not) exercise its "fact-
finding power," thus making its opinion non-binding. 2
Before examining the constitutionality of the Casino Act, the
court first determined the appropriateness of saying anything at
all.' 3 The court cited the Rhode Island Constitution as a source of
its authority for issuing advisory opinions, stating that "[t]he
judges of the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon
any question of law whenever requested by the governor or by ei-
ther house of the general assembly."4 It noted that prior cases
stated that the court was not obligated to issue an advisory opin-
ion unless the challenged statute was ready for implementation by
5. In re Advisory Opinion(Casino), 856 A.2d at 323.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 323-24.
10. Chief Justice Williams, Justice Suttell and Justice Weisberger signed
the advisory opinion, while Justices Goldberg, Flanders and Flaherty did not
participate. Id. at 334.
11. Id. at 323 (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553, 554 (R.I.
1961)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 324.
14. R.I. CONST. art 10, § 3.
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the governor. 15 Such was not the case in this situation because the
Casino Act could not go into effect until the voters approved the
referendum question. 16 Nevertheless, the court stated that it had
the discretion to issue an advisory opinion because the "pro-
pounded question raise[d] important constitutional or social ques-
tions."17 Rather than wait until the voters approved or rejected the
referendum, the court opined that it was preferable to act quickly
before members of the public waste time, energy and money, fa-
miliarizing themselves with the casino issue and the referen-
dum.'8 Rather than hold a false vote on a controversial issue, the
court cited its "strong preference for resolving election issues be-
fore the voters have spoken" as a primary reason for issuing its
opinion.19 The circumstances raised sufficiently important consti-
tutional and social questions and an advisory opinion was there-
fore appropriate. The court then turned to an analysis of the
merits of Governor Carcieri's request.
First, the court determined that the casino proposed by the
General Assembly represented a lottery operation. 20 Relying on
previous decisions that defined the term "lottery" expansively,
2
'
the court found a well-settled definition of a lottery as a "scheme
or a plan having three essential elements: consideration, chance,
and prize."22 The court applied the "dominant factor" doctrine to
determine whether the element of chance is present in a particu-
lar "scheme or plan."23 Under this doctrine, a scheme is defined as
a lottery "when an element of chance dominates the distribution of
prizes."24 Thus, the games proposed by the casino proponents,
such as roulette, craps, slot machines, poker and blackjack, were
examples of lotteries because of the strong degree of randomness
15. See In re Advisory Opinion, 856 A.2d at 324 (citing In re Advisory
Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318-19 (R.I. 1986)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 325.
19. Id. at 327.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Roberts v. Communications Investment Club of Woonsocket,
431 A.2d 1206, 1211 (R.I. 1981)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 328.
24. Id. (quoting Roberts, 431 A.2d at 1211).
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or chance that characterizes those games.25
If the games in question are lotteries, then the Rhode Island
Constitution is clear that they must be operated by the state. 26
The court found that the referendum question was contrary to the
Rhode Island Constitution because of its inclusion of the language
that the casino would be "operated by an Affiliate of Harrah's."27
The court saw that the referendum question itself violated the
Rhode Island Constitution on its face because "[a] clearer identifi-
cation of the casino operator cannot be imagined."28
The court further opined that the General Assembly could not
credibly argue that it was maintaining control over the casino and
simply delegating a significant portion of the operational respon-
sibility to other entities, namely Harrah's.29 It rejected the Gen-
eral Assembly's argument that the state's Lottery Commission
would actually be the casino operator.30 The court examined the
language of the Casino Act, which gave the Lottery Commission
jurisdictional and supervisory powers, stating that "[tihe Commis-
sion shall have jurisdiction over and shall supervise all gaming
operations governed by this chapter."31 The court described these
powers as regulatory, not operational, in nature and saw little
overlap between the two. 32 It pointed out that the word "'control'
indicates authority over the day-to-day functioning of an enter-
prise" and that such "operational control" was Harrah's: "Harrah's
would make day-to-day decisions having to do with the function-
ing of the proposed casino while the Lottery Commission merely
would enforce the applicable regulations.33 By failing to maintain
operational control over the proposed casino and actually stating
in the referendum question that a private entity would have such
control, the General Assembly ran afoul of the constitutional re-
quirement that lotteries within the state be run by the state.34
25. See id.
26. See R.I. CONST. art 6, § 15.
27. In re Advisory Opinion (Casino), 856 A.2d at 330.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Casino Act, § 41-9.1-5(a) (emphasis added).
32. In re Advisory Opinion (Casino), 856 A.2d at 331.
33. Id. at 331-32.
34. Id. at 332. The court also noted that neither of the constitutional ex-
ceptions applied to the casino proposed in the Casino Act, despite Harrah's
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Finally, the court stated that the existing constitutional
mechanism for expanding gambling in the state could not trump
the constitutional requirement that lotteries be state-run. 35
Casino proponents cited the "restriction of gambling" provi-
sion of the Rhode Island Constitution, which requires voter ap-
proval of any expansion of gambling in the state, in an attempt to
get around the requirement that all lotteries within the state be
run by the state.36 Casino proponents argued that the requirement
that any expansion of gambling be submitted to the state's voters
trumped the separate constitutional provision requiring that lot-
teries be state-run.37 However, the court stated that the two con-
stitutional provisions had to be read together. While one provision
addressed lotteries, the other addressed gambling ventures: "Al-
though all lotteries are a form of gambling, not all forms of gam-
bling are lotteries."38 To illustrate its point, the court pointed out
that while lotteries are predominantly games of chance, the same
is not true of all types of gambling. 39 For example, the state could
expand gambling, after holding a statewide referendum, on sports
such as horse racing, baseball or football and on games such as
chess or checkers because those games "depend primarily on skill
or judgment."40 Lotteries, by contrast, are predominantly games of
chance.4' Thus, to expand gambling activities, the state only needs
to hold a referendum on the subject.42 To expand lotteries, the
state needs to first hold a referendum and then maintain opera-
and the General Assembly's arguments to the contrary. Id. at 332-33.
35. Id. at 333.
36. Id.; The Rhode Island Constitution states:
No act expanding the types of gambling which are permitted within
the state or within any city or town therein or expanding the mu-
nicipalities in which a particular form of gambling is authorized
shall take effect until it has been approved by the majority of those
electors voting in a statewide referendum and by the majority of
those electors voting in a referendum in the municipality in which
the proposed gambling would be allowed.
R.I. CONST. art XI, § 22
37. In re Advisory Opinion (Casino), 856 A.2d at 333.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 333-34.
41. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
42. In re Advisory Opinion (Casino), 856 A.2d at 334.
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tional control over those lotteries if the voters approve them.43
COMMENTARY
Some observers may view the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the Casino Act and the
casino referendum question as a premature opinion that quashed
Rhode Islanders' opportunity to vote in the November elections on
this important issue. However, the court was simply averting
what could have become a constitutional crisis if it allowed an un-
constitutional referendum question to be put before the voters.
While the court should be wary to issue advisory opinions,
certain situations warrant them. The court said so in this opinion,
stating that its inaction would have simply postponed its inevita-
ble decision on the constitutional merits of the Casino Act.44 To
force casino proponents and opponents to mobilize their constitu-
encies and devote significant resources in an effort to win in No-
vember only to invalidate the entire enterprise a few months later
does not further the goals of honest or efficient government. The
Casino Act involved two strongly committed groups of voters and a
clash between the legislative and executive branches. If the Rhode
Island Constitution had not been implicated, a judicial opinion on
the matter would have been certainly unnecessary and perhaps
inappropriate. However, the Casino Act represented a clear viola-
tion of the Rhode Island Constitution's requirement that all lotter-
ies be state-run. To ignore that provision after being asked by the
governor to give an opinion on the matter would have been irre-
sponsible by the court.
In addition, the constant lobbying on the part of casino propo-
nents to erect a casino in Rhode Island has become a state pas-
time. Just over a decade ago in 1994, Rhode Island voters soundly
rejected a referendum that would have allowed the Narragansett
Indians to build a casino. The issue returned in 2004, with a
mammoth advertising campaign by casino proponents and over-
whelming support from the General Assembly for Harrah's plans
to build a casino. Such strong legislative support seemed at odds
with the much more closely divided views of the voters, whom
43. Id. at 333.
44. Id. at 325.
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most polls showed were evenly split on the issue.45 Had the gover-
nor and the supreme court not stepped in, casino supporters would
have been successful in thwarting the state constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Casino Act and controversy over the casino referendum
question represent the types of circumstances under which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court is willing to issue an advisory opin-
ion. Its decision represents the court's strong preference to resolve
an election-year issue replete with important constitutional issues
before Election Day, rather than waiting for a legal quagmire to
ensue. Despite issuing a non-binding opinion, the court did clarify
some constitutional issues regarding the future of a casino in
Rhode Island. First, it clearly held that the General Assembly
cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to operate any lot-
teries within the state. Any lottery within the state must also be
run by the state. Second, the court sent a strong message that it
will not allow the General Assembly to delegate that constitu-
tional responsibility to the Lottery Commission or to any private
entity. Finally, it made clear that any decision to build a casino in
the state must clear the constitutional hurdle requiring that all
lotteries be run by the state as well as the constitutional hurdle
that any proposal to expand gambling operations in the state must
be approved in a statewide referendum.
Matthew M. Mannix
45. Zachary R. Mider, Battle for R.L Casino Now Moves to Voters, PROVI-
DENCE J., Aug. 1, 2004, at B-01.
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Constitutional Law. Leddy v. Narragansett Television, 843 A.2d
481 (R.I. 2004). When a television broadcast utilizes express dis-
claimers that disclose the non-defamatory factual basis for an
opinion, and also disclaim all defamatory connotations, a person
may not prevail on a defamation claim against the television sta-
tion. Moreover, when disclaimers are not used, broadcasts that
contain vague and imprecise language not capable of defamatory
meaning are not subject to an action for defamation. Finally, a
news medium has not violated Rhode Island General Laws section
9-1-28 when it re-airs portions of previously televised non-
defamatory broadcasts in order to promote or advertise itself.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
"As the television cameras roll, an investigative reporter, in-
quiring about an issue of potential public interest, thrusts a mi-
crophone into the startled, hapless face of some speed-walking
employee, who is vainly attempting to short circuit the inter-
view."' This case arises out of a set of facts consistent with that
employee's lack of success. Gerald Leddy (Leddy), a Deputy Fire
Marshall working for the State of Rhode Island as a fire inspector,
was stopped by Channel 12 Eyewitness News reporter Vincent
DeMentri, and interviewed for a three part investigative series
about state employees who were concurrently the beneficiaries of
municipal disability pensions. 2 Leddy was one of a number of peo-
ple who had retired from the police or fire departments on a dis-
ability pension, and had subsequently received a job with the
State of Rhode Island. As a result, they received two salaries: one
from the State for full time work and another from a municipal
disability pension.3
The interview consisted of two questions in which DeMentri
asked Leddy (1) if he felt that he was "ripping off the system in
1. Leddy v. Narragansett Television, 843 A.2d 481, 483 (R.I. 2004)
(opening line of the majority opinion by now-retired Justice Robert G. Flan-
ders, Jr.)
2. Leddy, 843 A.2d at 483-84.
3. Id. at 484.
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some way,"4 and (2) if he felt that there were other tasks he could
have performed at the Providence Fire Department that would
have precluded his current status as a double salary earner. 5
Leddy responded that it was "possible" and then cut off further
questioning, suggesting that DeMentri contact his attorney.6
About six months later, Channel 12 aired a promotional spot
about its investigative news team that included brief segments of
previous interviews, including Leddy's, along with a voice over
suggesting that people could avoid similar interviews as long as
they did not "do anything wrong."7
Following the aforementioned broadcasts, Leddy sued Narra-
gansett Television, Vincent DeMentri and others for defamation
and violation of section 9-1-28.8 After a number of years of discov-
ery, the case came before the superior court on cross motions for
summary judgment.9 In an opinion issued from the bench, the
trial judge denied Leddy's motion for summary judgment and
granted that of Narragansett Television.' 0 The trial judge made
several determinations that later became the subject matter of
Leddy's appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court."
The court held that Leddy was a public official, and, as a re-
sult, was required to make a showing of actual malice in order to
prevail on his defamation claim.' 2 The basis for this holding was
Leddy's position as a fire investigator and the legitimate public
concern in the newscasts. 13 Regarding Leddy's position as a fire
investigator, the court found that it (1) potentially affected the
constitutionally protected liberty and property interests of various
individuals, (2) that law enforcement officials relied on his reports
to prosecute crimes such as arson, and (3) that his position was
like that of police officers in terms of the nature of his powers and
4. Id. at 485.
5. Id. at 485, n.2.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 485.
8. Id.; Action for Unauthorized Use of Name, Portrait, Picture, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-28 (Supp. 2004).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 486.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 485-86.
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his exposure to public scrutiny.14
The trial justice went on to find that Leddy had not met his
burden of proving actual malice on the part of Channel 12, namely
that defendants had actual knowledge of a falsehood or that they
had disseminated information with reckless disregard for the
truth.15 The trial justice also found that the disclaimers that had
been given at the beginning and at the end of the broadcast, mak-
ing it clear that no accusations of illegality were being waged and
the opportunity afforded plaintiff to tell his side of the story,
weighed in favor of a finding of summary judgment for defen-
dant.16 Finally, the trial justice held that he could not verify the
meaning of the words "wrong" and "ripping off' and was thus un-
able to render an opinion as to their intended connotations in the
broadcast.17
The trial justice, likewise, found plaintiffs statutory claim to
be without merit, and found the broadcast to have been privileged
as a matter of law under the doctrine of incidental use.'8 Because
the media has a constitutional right to disseminate information
about public officials in matters of public concern, the broadcast
did not violate the dictates of section 9-1-28.19
Plaintiff appealed the superior court decision on four separate
grounds: (1) that he was not a public official when the interview
was broadcasted, and so should not have had to prove actual mal-
ice; (2) that the broadcast of the interview and the promotional
spot constituted actual malice; (3) that the terms "wrong" and
"ripping off' were capable of defamatory meaning; and (4) that he
should have prevailed under section 9-1-28.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A claim for defamation requires proof on four separate ele-
ments: (1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) an unprivileged
communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) damages, unless
14. Id. at 485.
15. Id. at 486.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 486-91.
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the statement is actionable irrespective of social harm.21 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion in this case focuses on the
first element.
The court, after analyzing case law from other jurisdictions,
decided to assume for the purposes of the opinion that plaintiff
was not a public official. Citing the lack of case law on the subject
of whether or not firefighters or fire investigators should receive
public official status, and finding no answer in widely divergent
case law from other jurisdictions, the court moved onto the sub-
stantive portion of its analysis. 22
The court went on to decide, as a matter of law, that no de-
famatory statements were issued in the interview, or in the sub-
sequent promotional spot.23 The court reasoned that there had
been an adequate disclaimer of the fact that the station was mak-
ing no accusation as to illegality. Moreover, the reporter quite
clearly had not questioned the veracity of Leddy's medical prob-
lems, and it was clear from the context that he was not suggesting
that Leddy was "faking" his problems.24 Lastly, to hold the inter-
view defamatory, the court reasoned, would be to create a chilling
effect on legitimate criticism of government policy, something that
the United States Supreme Court had warned against in the
landmark case of New York Times Co v. Sullivan.25 Because, the
court reasoned, the comments at issue were, at worst, the expres-
sion of a "derogatory opinion about a subject of legitimate public
interest" the doctrine of fair comment provided legal immunity to
the factually based statements of opinion.26 The court went on to
indicate that the disclaimers had also done away with any poten-
tial inferences of defamatory meaning that the broadcast might
have contained.27
Because the subsequent promotional spot at issue had not
21. Id. at 488 (quoting Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 555
A.2d 321, 324 (R.I. 1989)).
22. Id. at 486-87. This decision had the effect of giving Leddy the oppor-
tunity to prove his case under a less onerous standard, and also of sending
the ultimate message that it would be difficult to prove a defamation claim
against a newspaper under any standard.
23. Id. at 487.
24. Id. at 487-88.
25. Id. at 488; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
26. Leddy, 843 A.2d at 488.
27. Id. at 489.
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carried express disclaimers as had the initial interview, the court
utilized slightly different reasoning in coming to the conclusion
that the spot had not carried defamatory meaning. The court held
that the word "wrong" was just too imprecise to carry a defama-
tory meaning, as a matter of law, because there was no way to
prove it true or false, precluding a finding of defamation.
28
Finally, the court agreed with the trial justice as to his find-
ing that Narragansett Television had not violated section 9-1-28
by exploiting the plaintiff by using his picture without permis-
sion.29 The court agreed with a number of other courts which had
ruled that free speech considerations protect brief rebroadcasts of
previously televised investigative reports utilized to promote a
new medium from invasion or wrongful use claims as long as the
original broadcast was not defamatory.
30
COMMENTARY
Although it is not a focal point of the opinion, Leddy v. Narra-
gansett Television marks the first time that the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court has engaged in statutory construction of section 9-1-
28. Before Leddy, the only authoritative construction of section 9-
1-28 was found in the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island's decision, Mendonsa v. Time, Inc.31 Leddy marks
the first time that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has refer-
enced Mendonsa, and with little fanfare, largely adopting its in-
terpretation. 32 Leddy does, however, add an important aspect to
Mendonsa's longstanding interpretation of the statute.
Mendonsa went through a painstaking historical analysis of
what was, at that time, a fairly new statutory provision.33 The dis-
trict court decided in that opinion that the initial publication of
the famous "kissing sailor" photograph taken on 'V-J Day" in 1945
was not actionable under section 9-1-28 because of the newswor-
thy value that it carried.34 Subsequent reprints of that photo-
graph, however, culminating in an offer to sell copies for $1600 a
28. Id.
29. Id. 490.
30. Id.
31. 678 F. Supp. 967 (D. R.I. 1988).
32. Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490.
33. Mendonsa, 678 F. Supp at 968-73.
34. Id. at 972.
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piece, did not carry the same newsworthy value and made up a set
of facts precluding a finding for defendants on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under which relief could be granted.35
Leddy marks the first time that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has analyzed a set of facts similar to those facing the dis-
trict court in Mendonsa. In response, the Leddy Court has adopted
a narrower construction of section 9-1-28 than the district court,
holding that subsequent rebroadcasts of initially newsworthy,
non-defamatory material are protected by the First Amendment.36
Notably, and appropriately, the court takes as persuasive a num-
ber of precedents from New York.3 7 This is appropriate because
the statute was initially modeled after a New York Civil Rights
Law which codified the birth of a new statutory right to privacy in
that jurisdiction. 38
By holding that the brief rebroadcast at issue in Leddy was
protected by the First Amendment as newsworthy, and as a "logi-
cal extension of the clearly protected editorial use of the content of
the publication,"39 the Rhode Island Supreme Court has skillfully
navigated a difficult line between the First Amendment and the
right to privacy in Rhode Island.
CONCLUSION
The court upheld in this case the right of a television station
to broadcast information of public concern as long as the underly-
ing facts were true and defamatory connotations were properly
disclaimed. Moreover, the court held that words that were too
vague or imprecise to be proven true or false were incapable of
carrying defamatory meanings and could not be the subject of a
successful claim of defamation against a television station. Fi-
nally, the court held that a television station had a right to re-
broadcast portions of previously aired non-defamatory material in
an effort to promote or advertise its services, and that, by doing so,
35. Id.; FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
36. Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490.
37. Id.; See, e.g,. Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y
1985); Gautier v. Pro Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952).
38. Mendonsa, 678 F. Supp at 971; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 51 (Consol.
1995).
39. Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490 (quoting Velez v. VV Publ'g Corp., 524
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (N.Y App. Div. 1988).
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it did not open itself up to a claim that it had violated the dictates
of section 9-1-28.
Bridget N. Longridge

Constitutional Law. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I.
2004). The Firearms Act, Rhode Island General Laws section 11-
47-18, does not infringe upon "the right of the people to keep and
bear arms" under the Rhode Island Constitution. Also, the rejec-
tion of an individual's application for a concealed weapon permit
does not necessitate a hearing, and further does not constitute a
contested case under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
The only method available to obtain judicial review of a denial of a
gun permit is through a writ of certiorari.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1998, Charles H. Mosby and Steven Golotto submitted
separate applications to the Rhode Island Department of the At-
torney General (Department) for permits to carry a concealed
weapon pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 11-47-18
(Firearms Act)' Under section 11-47-18(a), the Department is au-
thorized to issue a permit "upon a proper showing of need."
2
Mosby, who was an avid gun collector, and Golloto, a self-
employed shopkeeper, sought the permit for the purposes of per-
sonal protection as they both occasionally traveled with large
sums of cash.3
The Department reviewed and ultimately denied Mosby and
Golotto's applications stating that the department found "insuffi-
cient need" for the issuance of a permit to carry a concealed
weapon. 4 Although neither of the letters mentioned the possibility
of meeting with the department to contest the denial, Mosby and
his attorney met with Vincent McAteer, former Chief of the Rhode
Island Bureau of Criminal Identification, to discuss the board's
reasons for denying the permit.5 In June of 1999, the department
promulgated guidelines for reviewing applications to obtain a
1. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1034-35 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id. at 1035; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-18 (Supp. 2004).
3. Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1035.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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permit under the Firearms Act.6 Prior to this date, the department
had no written guidelines either explaining the application proc-
ess or criteria used to review applications.7
Mosby and Golotto filed suit in superior court claiming that
the department's denial of their original applications violated the
APA and their civil rights as guaranteed under the Rhode Island
Constitution.8 Both sought a declaratory judgment or writ of man-
damus compelling the issuance of the licenses.9 In the alternative,
plaintiffs asked the department to "(1) conduct a hearing on their
applications, (2) provide written copies of the rules, procedures
and standards that the department used to review applications for
licenses, and (3) pursuant to the APA, promulgate rules applicable
to applications to carry concealed weapons filed under section 11-
47-18."1o
The department moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The
hearing justice granted the department's motion, finding that the
APA did not vest the superior court with subject-matter jurisdic-
tion to review the department's decision as the application process
under section 11-47-18 was not a contested case." Mosby and
Gilotto subsequently appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. After hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that cause had been shown, thus warranting further brief-
ing and argument. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
1. Due Process: Article I, Section 22
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, applying the standard pre-
sumption of constitutionality, held that the Firearms Act did not
trigger due process concerns. 13 The court noted "[olnly when we
conclude that a constitutionally protected interest has been in-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id; R.I. CONST. art. XXII, § 2.
10. Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1035-36.
11. Id. at 1036.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1049.
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fringed '[will] we inquire whether the procedures afforded were
'constitutionally sufficient."' 14 Consequently, Mosby was not enti-
tled to a hearing on his application under section 11-47-18(a).
15
The court reasoned that although the Firearms Act "regulate[d]
and prohibit[ed] the ownership and possession of firearms," the
mandatory and discretionary licensing provisions contained in the
statute were sufficient to satisfy the constitutional guarantee to
"keep and bear arms." 6 The court further noted that the Firearms
Act does not infringe upon the citizens' right to possess a rifle,
shotgun, pistol, or revolver in their homes or places of employment
as guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Rhode Island Consti-
tution.' 7
The court relied upon a variety of both contemporary and his-
torical authorities in concluding that the framers of the Rhode Is-
land Constitution intended to extend the right to "bear arms"
exclusively to those in a branch of the military service. 18 The court
began its analysis of the phrase "bear arms" by referencing the
Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Aymette v. State.'9 Under
the Tennessee Constitution, "bear arms" was qualified by the
statement "for their common defense."20 However, the court ac-
knowledged the "divergent conclusions" reached by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.21 The
court found it notable that both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits
looked to the Rhode Island Ratification of the United States Con-
stitution to support the proposition that a military connotation
was intended by use of the term "bear arms" as evidenced by the
express reference to this term by the conscientious objector provi-
sion.22
14. Id. at 1038 (quoting DiCiantis v. Wall, 795 A.2d 1121, 1126 (R.I.
2002) (quoting Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989))).
15. Id. The court found that Mosby was the only party to the appeal as
Golotto had failed to timely pay his appellate filing fee. Id. at 1036.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1041.
19. Id. (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840)).
20. Id. (quoting Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 156).
21. Id.
22. Id. ("[Any person religiously scrupulous of baring arms, ought to be
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in
his stead.'"
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2. Firearms Act and Gun Permits in General
The court further held that the Firearms Act, considered in its
entirety, was an orderly act designed to "regulate the possession
and use of an array of weapons."23 After reviewing the provisions
of the act, the court noted that the purpose of the act was to re-
duce gun violence and protect children from negligent gun owners
and consequently fell within the state's police power. 24 The court
further found that the General Assembly was careful to avoid im-
posing any restrictions on gun ownership by a homeowner or
landowner.25 With respect to the discretionary authority vested in
the department, the court stated that when considered in relation
to the overarching "comprehensive scheme," section 11-47-18 did
not infringe upon "'[t]he right of the people to keep and bear
arms. "'26
The court also considered both the discretionary and manda-
tory components of the licensing provisions in support of the find-
ing that the Firearms Act did not infringe upon the "constitutional
guarantee to keep and bear arms."27 The court acknowledged that
23. Id. at 1045.
24. Id. at 1045-46.
25. Id. at 1047.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court stated that
[under section 11-47-11(a)] Mosby, a resident of Massachusetts who
holds several gun licenses from other states, was entitled to a carry-
ing permit from the licensing authority of any city or town. An avid
gun collector, plaintiff has a proper reason for carrying a pistol or re-
volver and there is no suggestion that he is an unsuitable person.
Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-47(a)(Supp. 2004):
The licensing authorities of any city or town shall, upon application
of any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide
residence or place of business within the city or town, or of any per-
son twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide residence
within the United States and a license or permit to carry a pistol or
revolver concealed upon his or her person issued by the authorities of
any other state or subdivision of the United States, issue a license or
permit to the person to carry concealed upon his or her person a pis-
tol or revolver everywhere within this state for four (4) years from
date of issue, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear
an injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper
reason for carrying a pistol or revolver, and that he or she is a suit-
able person to be so licensed. The license or permit shall be in tripli-
cate in form to be prescribed by the attorney general and shall bear
the fingerprint, photograph, name, address, description, and signa-
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section 11-47-18(a) conferred broad discretion to the department
when deciding whether to grant a permit; however, the court
found that this discretion did not infringe upon "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms."28 The court thus held that because
due process concerns were not triggered, Mosby was not entitled
to a hearing on his initial application filed in accordance with sec-
tion 11-47-18(a).
3. Implicit Hearing Requirement under Section 11-47-18
Relying on Colonial Hilton Inns of New England, Inc. v.
Rego,29 Mosby argued that a hearing was implicitly required un-
der section 11-47-18.30 The court distinguished Colonial Hills, not-
ing that section 46-6-2 expressly acknowledged that the rights of
riparian property owners could be impaired by the filling of sub-
merged lands.31 Thus, in Colonial Hills, the court found that sec-
tion 46-6-2 triggered procedural due process concerns, which
called for a pre-deprivation hearing. With respect to section 11-47-
18, the court found "no analogous limitation on the licensing of in-
dividuals to carry concealed weapons."32
4. Required Procedures Under Section 11-47-18.
The court held that although the Firearms Act was "reason-
able and lawful," the department cannot be vested with "carte
blanche authority" when deciding who may carry a concealed
weapon. 33 The court reasoned that "unfettered discretion" would
ture of the licensee and the reason given for desiring a license or
permit and in no case shall it contain the serial number of any fire-
arm. The original shall be delivered to the licensee. Any member of
the licensing authority, its agents, servants, and employees shall be
immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon any of-
ficial act or decision, performed or made in good faith in issuing a li-
cense or permit under this chapter (emphasis added).
Id.
28. Id. at 1048. The court further found that "because the statute under
consideration vests the Attorney General with discretion to refuse a license
even if a person makes a 'proper showing of need,' we are of the opinion that
it has no impact on any constitutionally protected liberty interest." Id.
29. 284 A.2d 69 (R.I. 1971)
30. Id. at 1049.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1050.
86320051
864 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:859
render the constitutional right to bear arms illusory. 34 To prevent
the abrogation of this right, the court held that review of these li-
censing decisions was available through a common law writ of cer-
tiorari. 35 Although the court noted that review of these decisions
would be limited to determining whether sufficient facts sup-
ported the denial of the permit, the court found that the depart-
ment must adhere to the minimal procedural safeguards as
required by section 11-47-18 and provide applicants with the rea-
sons for the denial of their permit requests. 36 Because Mosby did
not seek a writ of certiorari, the court determined that it could not
properly consider the merits of the department's denial of his re-
quest. 37
5. Justice Flanders's Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Flanders noted that the right to
keep and bear arms is necessary for both self-defense and as a
"counterweight to the omnipresent threat that government rulers
exercising arbitrary power."38 Justice Flanders lamented the "fa-
vorite son" treatment that the majority bestowed upon the term
"keep arms" at the expense of its "arms-bearing brother."39 Justice
Flanders further commented that the majority's treatment of the
right to bear arms reduced the right to "a much diminished paltry
thing - more a one-trick toy pony than a palladium of republican
liberty."40
COMMENTARY
The majority's decision in Mosby, although not explicitly ad-
dressing the Second Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, reflects the considerable controversy over the proper
interpretation of the term "bear arms." By endorsing the position
in that "bear arms" was intended to have a military connotation as
opposed to the textual interpretation advocated by Justice Flan-
ders, the majority has highlighted the inherent difficulties in-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1051.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1052 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1057.
40. Id.
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volved when assessing historical evidence. Although both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions purport to give unambiguous words
in the constitution their plain and ordinary meaning, the majority
and dissent accorded very different meanings to the text of article
I, section 22 in their respective interpretations.
The majority essentially undertook a pragmatic approach in
assessing the procedures specified by the Firearms Act. After em-
phasizing that the Firearms Act was intended to prevent crimi-
nals from acquiring dangerous weapons, while ensuring that it
was not unduly difficult for other members of society to attain
such weapons, the majority affirmed the application of the police
power to legislation which does indeed make it more difficult for
an individual to carry a concealed weapon.
CONCLUSION
This case confirms the right of the Department of the Attor-
ney General to deny requests to carry weapons without providing
a hearing. However, the decision ensures that the right to "keep
and bear arms" will not be swallowed by the police power as the
department will be forced to articulate with specificity the
factual basis upon which it relied upon to deny the requested
permit. Furthermore, these denials may be reviewed through a
writ of certiorari.
Jon Kukucka
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Contract Law. Gorman v. St. Raphael Academy, 853 A.2d 28
(R.I. 2004). In this case of first impression the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that the arbitrary and capricious standard is
not the proper test for evaluating the lawfulness of a private
school rule or regulation. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is
whether a private school contract term is contrary to law or public
policy. Unless a contract term violates public policy, the court will
not inject itself into a private school's rule-making authority.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Hair battles that combed their way through courts during the
1970s returned last year when a Saint Raphael Academy student
and his parents fought for his right to wear his hair in a mullet
style.' While the Rhode Island Superior Court would have allowed
the student to sport his mullet-styled hair,2 the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court sent the student back to the barbershop.3
In fall 2000 plaintiff Russell Gorman III applied for admission
to St. Raphael Academy, a Catholic, coeducational high school in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island.4 With mullet-styled hair, the honors
student visited the school several times and interviewed with
school officials before finally receiving a letter of acceptance from
the school principal in January 2001.5 During the eighth grader's
visits no school official mentioned his long locks. 6 Russell began
1. Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, C. A. No. PC 2001-4821, 2002 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 141, at *38 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 2002) (citing Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970)).
2. Id. at *46-47.
3. Gorman v. St. Raphael Academy, 853 A.2d 28, 31-32 (R.I. 2004). The
court gave the student the option of cutting his hair to conform with the
school's policy or be subject to disciplinary action and possible dismissal as
provided for in the 2002-03 student handbook. Id. See also Edward Fitz-
patrick, Court: School has Right to Expel Student, PROVIDENCE J., July 16,
2004, at B-01 ("While the state's high court did not tell [the student] to cut
his hair, [Justice Paul A.] Suttell concluded the 17-page opinion by ... en-
courag[ing] him to complete his senior year at Saint Raphael.").
4. Gorman, 853 A.2d at 30-31.
5. Id. at31.
6. Id.
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the ninth grade in August 2001 but by his second or third week of
school, school officials gave Russell an option: cut his hair or be
expelled. 7
Unable to convince the school to allow him to keep his tresses,
Russell, with the support of his parents, Kimberly Gorman and
Russell Gorman, Jr., filed a complaint against the school in Rhode
Island Superior Court alleging breach of contract.8 On September
25, 2001 the trial justice granted a temporary restraining order
enjoining the school from expelling Russell because of his hair.9
In May 2002, the school's principal revised the student hand-
book to include a new hair code for male students.10 Included in
the provision was "Outlandish hairstyles (ex. any designs, letter-
ing, Mohawks, pony tails, etc. engraved/cut into their hair...) are
not in keeping with the school's education mission and will not be
tolerated. A boy's hair may not be longer than the bottom of his
shirt collar.""
In August 2002, the Gormans filed an amended complaint al-
leging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief allowing
Russell to attend school within the dictates of the 2001-2002
handbook, or within the dictates of the 2002-2003 handbook ex-
cept the provision relating to hair length. 2
The school agreed to permit Russell to remain at the school
until the court heard the case so long as he tucked his pony-tailed
hair into his shirt collar.13
In October 2002, Associate Justice Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr.
granted the permanent injunction 4 in a decision quoting the mu-
sical "Hair"15 and Pink Floyd. 16 The trial justice also granted
plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees of $1,505 for litigating the
temporary restraining order. 17 The plaintiffs motion for attorney's
7. Id. at 30-31.
8. Id. at 30.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, C. A. No. PC 2001-4821, 2002 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 141, at *1 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 2002) ("Hair, hair, hair, hair,
hair, hair; Flow it, show it; Long as God can grow it hair...
16. Id. at *51 ("Leave the kids alone!").
17. Id.
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fees for the hearings on the permanent restraining order was de-
nied. 18 The order for costs was stayed pending appeal.19
Saint Raphael appealed, asserting six errors. The school con-
tended that the trial justice erred (1) by failing to apply contract
law; (2) by applying a rational relationship test, which required
the defendant to prove that the hair code was related to the educa-
tional process; (3) by improperly placing the burden of proof on the
defendant; (4) by finding that the rule was arbitrary and capri-
cious without supporting evidence; (5) by improperly substituting
its judgment for that of Saint Raphael's the administration; and
(6) by erroneously disregarding the constitutional rights of par-
ents who choose to educate their children at Saint Raphael. 20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
While the case was one of first impression in Rhode Island,21
the court was quick to note that strict adherence to contract law is
unnecessary when private school contracts are at issue. 22 The
court looked to other jurisdictions that recognize an educational
contract carries with it the right to modify disciplinary and aca-
demic rules and regulations. 23 As such, courts typically construe
educational contracts to give schools flexibility to meet their edu-
cational responsibilities. 24 The court concluded that Gorman's tui-
tion contract with the school was renewable annually.25 Each year
students' parents or guardians were required to sign a tuition con-
tract for the specific academic year, along with a student hand-
book each year.26 Thus, when the handbook was revised to
prohibit certain hairstyles, students were bound by the hand-
book's terms for that academic year.27
The trial court used a rational basis test to strike down the
school's policy. 28 The trial justice acknowledged that private
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *20.
22. Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, 853 A.2d 28, 34 (2004).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 35.
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schools may change their policies; however, changes made to con-
trolling rules and regulations "should be enacted in good faith and
not bespeak the arbitrary or capricious."29 The trial justice further
noted that the school had failed to produce any evidence proving
that "long hair worn by male students affects the educational
process, discipline or decorum of the school, or has anything to do
with the dogma or rules of the Roman Catholic Church."30
Despite the trial court's ruling, the supreme court concluded,
"the determination of what rules or policies comply with the
school's mission statement is an exercise more appropriately and
properly left to the school administration."31 The court relied upon
testimony from the school's principal indicating that the policy
was implemented in response to a lack of student discipline and
respect for teachers.32 The hair code was one part of the school's
effort to "create a sense of community and shared values for all
students, prevent distractions, promote a team-spirit, and create a
common value-based culture of calmness and order."33 With this
background, the supreme court concluded that the hair-length
regulation was not arbitrary or capricious, nor did it lack a ra-
tional basis.34
In reversing the decision of the superior court, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court took issue with the trial court's application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard.35 The court instead held
that the proper inquiry is "whether the term at issue in a contract
involving a private educational institution is contrary to law or
public policy."36 The trial court relied on Herbert v. Ventetuolo 37 for
the proposition that "there should be 'no judicial interference with
the internal affairs, rules and by-laws of a voluntary association
unless their enforcement would be arbitrary, capricious or consti-
tute an abuse of discretion."'38 In rejecting application of the arbi-
29. Id. (quoting Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, 2002 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 141, at *34 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 2002)).
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 36-37
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id.
37. 480 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1984).
38. Id. at 37 (quoting Herbert, 480 A.2d at 407).
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trary and capricious standard in this case, the supreme court
found that Herbert, a case involving a voluntary association of
public school principals did not control cases involving private
school regulations, such as the hair policy at issue in Gorman.
3 9
Having rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard for ex-
amining private school regulations, the court instead held that the
appropriate inquiry is "whether the term at issue in a contract in-
volving a private educational institution is contrary to law or pub-
lic policy."40 Stressing that private schools, such as Saint Raphael,
have voluntary contractual relationships with students, the court
noted that "[p]rivate schools must have considerable latitude to
formulate and enforce their own rules to accomplish their aca-
demic and educational objectives. These rules and regulations
generally are binding on those who wish to remain members, pro-
vided however, that said rules do not conflict with public policy."
41
Under general contract law in Rhode Island, a contract vio-
lates public policy only if it is "1) injurious to the interests of the
public, 2) interferes with the public welfare or safety, 3) is uncon-
scionable; or 4) tends to injustice or oppression."42 The court
adopted the same standard to determine whether a rule or regula-
tion in a private school contract is lawful.4 Because the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the hair provision was contrary to public pol-
icy, the court held that the rule was a "valid exercise of [the
school's] discretionary authority and an enforceable provision of
its educational contract with students."4 Accordingly, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior
court.
4 5
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision marks the first
time a court has been called upon to decide the validity of a pri-
39. Id. ("A private school is not a state actor, and thus no governmental
intrusion is implicated in the promulgation and enforcement of a private
school's rules and regulations.").
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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vate school hair-length regulation.46 While the superior court
thought that any changes made to pre-existing rules and regula-
tions must be enacted in good faith, 47 the supreme court summa-
rily concluded it best to overlook strict adherence to contract law
when dealing with private school contracts. 48 The court offered lit-
tle explanation for abandoning contract principles beyond express-
ing the importance of providing school administrators with
flexibility to determine the institution's educational goals.49 The
supreme court decision garnered local support as the state news-
paper's editorial page proclaimed, "[flinally a ray of sanity in the
case involving young Russell Gorman and his silly hairdo."o The
editorial continued, "[tihe state Supreme Court has now said what
was obvious and sensible: A private school may make its own
rules on such matters as length of hair."51
While it was difficult for the supreme court to find legal sup-
port for its conclusion, it appears the newspaper editorial was
right. Logic dictates that parents who enroll their children in pri-
vate high schools should expect that the school will make rules
that will help foster its educational mission. Although the trial
court still disputes whether the hair code actually effectuated edu-
cational goals, this factor was not critical for the supreme court
because the voluntary contract did not violate public policy. No
further showing was necessary for the court to reach its conclusion
to sustain the regulation.
While the result is legally sound, equity may dictate the oppo-
site result. Adolescent students wishing to express themselves
through hairstyles that divert from the norm are hindered by the
school's prohibition. Indeed, the trial court distinguished hair-
styles from school uniforms, maintaining that at the end of the
day, a student can strip away the uniform and don the clothing of
his choice, but a student cannot wear a crew cut to school and a
46. Id. at 34 ("[We have found no other published case from any otherjurisdiction that examines the validity of a hair-length rule in a private edu-
cational institution.").
47. Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, C. A. No. PC 2001-4821, 2002 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 141, at *35 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 2002).
48. Gorman, 853 A.2d at 34.
49. Id.
50. Editorial, Cutting the Nonsense, PROVIDENCE J., July 18, 2004, at I-
08.
51. Id.
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mullet on the weekend.5 2 Although public school hair regulations
have been continually struck down as unconstitutional on the
grounds that students have a fundamental right to select their
"own individual hair style without government direction,"53 the is-
sue is altogether different with respect to private school regula-
tions. Regardless of the degree that private school regulations
stifle a student's expression, contract law changes the issue. A
party to the contract must abide by the terms of the voluntary as-
sociation. When the private school chose to add a hair code for
male students in its 2002-2003 student handbook, the Gormans
had a choice: abide by the rule or withdraw from the school.
Beyond its decision regarding the school's hair policy, the de-
cision is significant for its import in future private school cases.
Instead of examining private school rules and regulations under
general contract law, with considerations of good faith and fair
dealing, the only way a student will be able to challenge a private
school regulation under contract law is if the regulation violates
public policy.
CONCLUSION
Rhode Island private schools may impose contractual rules
and regulations so long as they do not violate public policy. Under
Rhode Island law, the arbitrary and capricious standard applied
to voluntary associations is not applicable to private schools. Be-
cause a hair regulation does not violate public policy, it may be
imposed on students whose parents or guardians sign the tuition
contract and student handbook for that academic year.
Nicole J. Dulude
52. Gorman v. St. Raphael's Academy, C. A. No. PC 2001-4821, 2002 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 141, at *43-44 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 2002).
53. See, e.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972).
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Criminal Law. State of Rhode Island v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659
(R.I. 2004). Rhode Island General Laws section 12-5-2, defining
the Rhode Island Superior Court's power to issue search warrants,
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for the seizure of a
blood sample taken from a suspect involuntarily. Blood samples do
not constitute "property" under this provision. Further, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court refused to modify this statute judicially, re-
serving that option for the legislature. The search warrant statute
was amended, in reaction to and as a result of the Dearmas deci-
sion, allowing issuance of such search warrants.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury on two counts of first-
degree child molestation.' After pleading not guilty to the charges,
the Rhode Island Superior Court issued a blood-seizure order.
Recognizing petitioner's unwillingness to consent to give a blood
sample, the court "instructed the state to apply for the issuance of
a search warrant."2 Subsequently, the court granted the state's
request for a search warrant but stayed the execution of that war-
rant pending review from the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
3
Thereafter, a duty justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stayed the superior court blood-seizure order.4 The court granted
petitioner's writ of certiorari and continued the stay until further
order.5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The question before the Rhode Island Supreme Court in this
case was whether "issuing an order granting the state's motion to
seize a sample of petitioner's blood, authorizing the state to apply
for a search warrant to effectuate this seizure, and then issuing a
1. State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 661 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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search warrant for the police to seize a vial of petitioner's blood"6
exceeded the power of the superior court.7 Noting that the supe-
rior court "is statutory in origin"8 and, therefore, derives its power
solely from legislative enactments, the court looked to Rhode Is-
land General Laws section 12-5-2 to determine whether the supe-
rior court's issuance of the blood-seizure order and the
corresponding search warrant were within the ambit of authority
granted by that statute.9
At the time of the decision, section 12-5-2 read in relevant
part: "A warrant may be issued under this chapter to search for
and seize any property... [wihich is evidence of the commission of
a crime." 10 Holding that "section 12-5-2 expressly limited the trial
justice's authority ... to issue search warrants only to 'search for
and seize any property,""' the supreme court limited the issue to
whether blood samples constitute property under section 12-5-2.12
Because section 12-5-2 does not define "property," the court, pur-
suant to the rules of statutory construction, looked to the plain
meaning of the word "property".13 Citing Black's Law Dictionary
and prior case law, the court held that the plain meaning of the
word "property" excluded blood samples taken from an unwilling
suspect as a form of property subject to seizure under section 12-5-
2.14 The court reasoned that allowing blood samples seized from
an unwilling suspect to constitute property for the purposes of sec-
tion 12-5-2 "would raise a host of practical and interpretive prob-
lems" and would give attorneys the opportunity to argue for the
issuance of "even more intrusive warrants for the seizure of other
body parts and biological material, and, indeed, of even living per-
sons themselves if needed to prove a criminal case." 15 The court
recognized the potential public-policy implications noting that
"[viiolent confrontations could result if the state were allowed to
forcibly extract a blood sample from an unwilling suspect or de-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 2000)).
9. Id. at 661-62.
10. R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-5-2 (Supp. 2004).
11. Dearmas, 841 A.2d at 662.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 663.
15. Id. at 663-64.
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fendant."'16
Finally, the court squared its holding that blood samples do
not constitute property for the purposes of section 12-5-2 with the
intent of the Rhode Island Legislature to limit authorization of
general searches and seizures of a person's bodily fluids. The court
reasoned that because "the Legislature has deliberately identified
certain limited and specific circumstances under which a person
must submit to the involuntary extraction of his or her blood,"
then it should be the legislature, and not the judiciary, that de-
cides whether to expand section 12-5-2 to encompass such circum-
stances.17
Pursuant to its holding that the superior court did not have
the authority to issue a search warrant for the seizure of blood
samples from the unwilling petitioner, the court quashed the
blood-seizure order and corresponding search warrant, and re-
manded the case to the superior court for further proceedings.'
8
COMMENTARY
The court's holding in Dearmas made positive law out of the
dicta that was enunciated three years prior in State v. DiStefano.19
In DiStefano, the court was required to interpret the driving-
under-the-influence laws to determine whether "the 'none shall be
given' language of Rhode Island General Laws section 31-21-2.1(b)
barred the use of a search warrant to seize a nonconsenting motor-
ist's blood after the state arrested the motorist for driving under
the influence, death resulting."20 While making this determina-
tion, Justice Goldberg and two other justices expounded on the po-
tential invalidity of the issuance of a search warrant for the
seizure of blood samples under the then current language of sec-
tion 12-5-2,21 because a majority of the court did not need to decide
that precise issue in order to reach its ultimate holding, the lan-
guage of the DiStefano case regarding the limits of the superior
court's warrant power pursuant to section 12-5-2 lived on only in
16. Id. at 664.
17. Id. at 664-65.
18. Id. at 668.
19. 764 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 2000).
20. Dearmas, 841 A.2d at 663 (referring to the holding in DiStefano).
21. DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1168.
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dicta.22 The DiStefano court's unwillingness to define blood sam-
ples as "'property' or evidence of the commission of a crime" how-
ever, proved influential to the ultimate decision in Dearmas.23
In DiStefano, "two justices.., were of the opinion that section
12-5-2 did not authorize the seizure of a blood sample, while a
third justice.., noted that section 12-5-2's 'apparent property-
seizure limitations... raises very difficult and troubling questions
about the propriety of issuing search warrants at all to seize a
person's blood.'"24 These three justices, however, did not take the
position that authority to issue search warrants for the seizure of
blood samples ought not to be extended to the superior court. In
fact, Chief Justice Weisberger observed that while "sound policy
would support legislation that would enable a police officer to ob-
tain a warrant for the production of a blood sample... [tihe sad
fact is that [section 12-5-2] simply does not authorize the issuance
of such a warrant."25 While the justices of the DiStefano court may
have believed that search warrants for the seizure of blood sam-
ples should issue in appropriate circumstances, they indicate that
the ultimate decision to extend section 12-5-2 to encompass those
circumstances was one that rested solely with the Rhode Island
Legislature.26 The court's decision in Dearmas, which excluded
blood samples from the types of material for which search war-
rants may issue under section 12-5-2, simply codified the supreme
court's position in DiStefano that proper judicial restraint requires
the court to avoid "tortur[ing] the language of these various rele-
vant statutes in order to bring about [a] desired result."27
Interestingly, while the Rhode Island Legislature did not
amend section 12-5-2 subsequent to the DiStefano decision (de-
spite Chief Justice Weisberger's plea to that effect in that case28 ).
However, following the Dearmas decision, the statute was
amended to read: "A warrant may be issued ... to search for and
seize ... [s]amples of blood, saliva, hair, bodily tissues, bodily flu-
ids, or dental impressions from the body of a person.... " 29 This
22. See Dearmas, 841 A.2d at 663.
23. See id.
24. Id. (citing Distefano, 764 A.2d at 1172).
25. Distefano, 764 A.2d at 1170.
26. See id.
27. Id.; see Dearmas, 841 A.2d at 664-65.
28. Distefano, 764 A.2d at 1170-71.
29. R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-5-2 (Supp. 2004).
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new language authorizing the issuance of search warrants for the
seizure of blood samples seemingly closes the book on the DiSte-
fano/Dearmas controversy and the ability of defendants to contest
the validity of such warrants. However, defendants who find their
blood the target of a search warrant issued pursuant to the new
language of section 12-5-2 may find themselves arguing that arti-
cle 1, section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution - which pro-
vides: "No person in a court of common law shall be compelled to
give self-criminating evidence"30 - renders such warrants uncon-
stitutional infringements of a person's privilege not to be com-
pelled to give self-criminating evidence.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."31 In Distefano, Justice Flanders's
dissent compares this language to that of article I section 13 of the
Rhode Island Constitution. 32 Noting that the language of the Fifth
Amendment limits it to a prohibition against compelling people to
give testimonial or communicative self-incriminating evidence,
Justice Flanders stated that "the Rhode Island Constitution does
not seem to incorporate, by its terms, an express testimonial or a
communicative limitation on the compelled giving of evidence by a
person."33 Thus, according to Justice Flanders, it is possible that
"the framers drafted article 1, section 13, in such a manner as to
provide for a broader ban on the government's compelling of self-
incriminatory acts than the Fifth Amendment." 34 While Justice
Flanders admits that prior Rhode Island judicial decisions have
refused to differentiate between the applicable standard to be
used under article 1, section 13 and that of the Fifth Amendment,
he also notes that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to had
the opportunity to "examine the potentially critical difference in
the wording of these two constitutional provisions and its arguable
significance in cases in which the government requires a suspect
'to give self-criminating evidence' that is not in itself of a commu-
30. R.I. CONST. art I, § 13.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1172 (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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nicative or a testimonial nature"35 - i.e., cases where defendants
are required to give blood samples.
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court were to construe article 1,
section 13, as expansively as Justice Flanders opines, then, logi-
cally, the newly amended language of section 12-5-2 authorizing
the issuance of a search warrant for potentially self-criminating
evidence such as blood samples would be considered invalid the
state constitution. This question, however, remains open.
CONCLUSION
In Dearmas, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
plain language of section 12-5-2 prohibited the issuance of a
search warrant for the seizure of a non-consenting suspect's blood.
Although an amendment to this statute allowing for the issuance
of such search warrants has rendered the Dearmas decision ir-
relevant, thereby eliminating possible statutory challenges to the
issuance of search warrants for blood samples, there remains the
possibility that the court may still strike down the new amend-
ment as unconstitutional pursuant to the expansive language of
the state constitution's privilege against self incrimination.
Thomas Gonnella
35. Id. at 1172-73.
Criminal Law. State of Rhode Island v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541
(R.I. 2004). Appeal of the admission of identification testimony
pursuant to Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence is im-
permissible if the specific grounds for objection have not been ar-
ticulated at trial under the "raise or waive" rule. Furthermore, an
individual convicted of robbery is not entitled to jury instructions
on the crimes of obtaining money by false pretenses or receiving
stolen goods because those crimes are not lesser included offenses
of robbery.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
For fifty-three years, Lane's Discount Store on Hartford Ave-
nue in Providence was never robbed.' On February 9, that inci-
dent-free existence was shattered when three masked men
brandishing guns burst into the store, leapt over the counter and
demanded that the proprietor, Pasquale Lanfredi, and two of his
employees, Gloria Marovelli and Joanne Pelosi, show them the
money.2 All three were held at gunpoint, and Marovelli and Pelosi
were forced into a back cooler where their hands were bound with
rope.3
The robbers forced Lanfredi, at gunpoint, to the front of the
store and demanded he lock the doors; however, he did not lock
them.4 He was then forced to the floor behind the counter while
the robbers looted the cash drawers. 5 While this was taking place,
Maritza Montes, a regular customer, entered the store.6 One of the
robbers immediately approached her, waving a gun, and took her
into the back cooler where she was bound with the other women. 7
Montes stated that she saw the robber's face because his mask
was rolled up on his head when she was first approached, and that
1. State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 544 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 544-45.
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later, while bound, she looked over her shoulder and once again
saw the robber's face.8 The robbers then bound Lanfredi, put him
in the cooler, and fled. 9
On February 11, the police summoned Montes to the station
where she identified the defendant, James Grant, as one of the
robbers from a photo array.10 Police arrested Grant the next day."
An inventory search was conducted following the arrest, and sev-
eral items were seized from Grant, including a backpack. 2 How-
ever, during this initial inventory search the contents of the
backpack were not inventoried. 13 Noticing this defect in the initial
search, Officer Corey Morris conducted a second inventory search
and catalogued the contents of the backpack. 14 His inventory
search revealed a roll of nickels and lottery tickets linked to the
robbery. 15 The prosecution sought to have that evidence admitted
at trial.16
At trial, both Montes' identification testimony and the items
found in the backpack were admitted into evidence. 17 Grant did
not object to the admission of Montes' testimony at trial, but made
only a "boilerplate written motion" prior to trial to all identifica-
tion testimony arguing that, in general, admission of such evi-
dence would violate his state and federal constitutional rights.'8
Additionally, defense counsel waived argument on this motion,
choosing instead to answer questions from the trial justice. 19
Those questions focused on whether the photo array was sugges-
tive, not whether Montes had the requisite personal knowledge.20
The generalized motion was denied, and Grant was convicted on
five charges including first-degree robbery.21
On appeal, Grant raised several points of error. First, he ob-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 545.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 549.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 549-50.
17. Id. at 547-48.
18. Id. at 547.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 549-50.
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jected to the admission of Montes' identification testimony on the
basis that she lacked the personal knowledge to make the identifi-
cation.22 Grant also argued that the trial justice should have in-
structed the jury as to the "lesser included offenses" of receiving
stolen property and obtaining money by false pretenses, a ques-
tion never before considered by the court.23 Finally, Grant averred
that, because the second inventory search conducted by Officer
Morris was improper, the items recovered from the backpack were
inadmissible at trial.24 Grant, however, failed on all counts as the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Goldberg,
rejected his claims and affirmed the trial justice's decision.
BACKGROUND
Two Rhode Island doctrines are relevant to Grant's contention
that Montes lacked the personal knowledge necessary to make the
identification. First, Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evi-
dence states: "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evi-
dence is produced sufficient to support a finding that the witness
has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the wit-
ness himself or herself."25 In State v. Nhek, 26 the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that this rule addresses whether the witness
had the opportunity to perceive the events about which she will
testify, not the likelihood that her recollection was accurate.27
Secondly, the well-established "raise or waive" doctrine con-
cerning whether issues have been preserved for appeal is perti-
nent.28 For an issue to be heard on appeal, the appellant must
have timely and appropriately objected during the trial.29 Addi-
tionally, that objection must be sufficiently particular so that the
trial justice could have known the basis for the objection. 30
Grant's claim that the trial justice should have instructed the
22. Id. at 547.
23. Id. at 548.
24. Id. at 549.
25. R.I. R. EVID. 602.
26. 687 A.2d 81 (R.I. 1997).
27. Id. at 83.
28. Grant, 840 A.2d at 546-47.
29. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972-73 (R.I. 1994).
30. State v. Addison, 748 A.2d 814, 820 (R.I. 2000).
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jury on lesser included offenses is governed by both state and fed-
eral law requiring all of the elements of a lesser included offense
be present in the offer of proof for the greater offense. 31
Finally, the law governing Grant's challenge of the inventory
search performed on his backpack is well-established. It is a fun-
damental principle of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments that citizens shall be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 32 Article I, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution en-
sures this same protection.33 Furthermore, Rhode Island prece-
dent has long held that inventory searches are explicitly protected
as valid warrantless searches provided they are conducted in ac-
cordance with valid police procedures.34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Two elements of the court's holding bear significance in the
development of Rhode Island law: (1) the application of the "raise
or waive" doctrine to Grant's claim that Montes lacked personal
knowledge; and (2) the determination that obtaining money by
false pretenses and receiving stolen goods are not lesser included
offenses of robbery.
First, the court held that the "raise or waive" doctrine barred
consideration of Grant's claim because the objection had not been
made with sufficient particularity to be preserved for review. 35
The "boilerplate" written objection made prior to trial did not ad-
dress the issue of whether Montes had personal knowledge, and,
therefore, it was improper to consider the issue of personal knowl-
edge on appeal.36
The court did, however, examine the propriety of Montes'
identification in the photo array, finding that she had the requi-
site knowledge to make the identification.37 Because Montes
stated that she saw the assailant's face and that the room was
31. See State v. Godette, 751 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 2000); State v.
Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 729-30 (R.I. 1999); Blockburger v. Unites States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
32. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
33. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6.
34. See State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1149 (R.I. 1980). For the corre-
sponding federal doctrine, see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
35. State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 547 (R.I. 2004).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 547-48.
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well-lit, the court found that she certainly had the opportunity to
obtain the knowledge required to make the identification under
Rule 602.38 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would require
the trial justice to make a determination as to Montes' credibility,
a determination properly made by the jury.39
In disposing of the claim that the jury should have been in-
structed on the misdemeanor crimes of receiving stolen property
and obtaining money by false pretenses as lesser included offenses
of robbery, the court directed its attention to the statutes defining
the crimes.40 The court held that each of the misdemeanor crimes
was statutorily defined to include at least one element that was
not included in the common law definition of robbery.4 ' Therefore,
none qualified as a lesser included offense. 42
Finally, in examining the propriety of the inventory search,
the court simply looked to the reasonableness of the second inven-
tory search and the extent to which it was consistent with police
procedure. 43 Because it was police procedure to conduct inventory
searches, and it was reasonable to follow up on an incomplete in-
ventory search with a second, complete inventory search, nothing
about the search of Grant's backpack was improper.44 Therefore,
the "fruits" of that search were admissible at trial.45
COMMENTARY
For the most part this case is a fairly unremarkable applica-
tion of existing law to a new set of facts. Particularly, both the de-
termination of the propriety of the inventory search and the
analysis of the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602 add
nothing to Rhode Island law.
The determination that both receiving stolen property and ob-
taining money by false pretenses are not lesser included offenses
of robbery is, as the court acknowledged, novel.46 However, it is
38. Id. at 547.
39. Id. at 547-48.
40. Id. at 548-49.
41. Id. Robbery is not statutorily defined in Rhode Island, thus, the
common law definition of the crime governs in this state.
42. Id. at 548.
43. Id. at 550.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 551.
46. Id. at 548.
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novel only insofar as the question had never been considered. It
was not some ground breaking determination, but rather a
straightforward application of the law defining what is and what
is not a lesser included offense. Nevertheless, those two misde-
meanors are definitely not lesser included offenses of robbery.
The aspect of the case with the greatest amount of import,
however, is the application of the "raise or waive" rule to bar con-
sideration of the personal knowledge claim under Rule 602. While
the "raise or waive" rule long has been an element in determining
what is appropriate for appellate review,47 it has generally been
applied in circumstances when there has been no objection at
trial.
In Grant, the defendant did object to the identification testi-
mony of Montes before trial.48 The objection, however, was a gen-
eral objection to all identification testimony.49 The court
previously stated in State v. Bettencourt, that when a specific ob-
jection is made at trial, other grounds for objection will not be con-
sidered on appeal.50  Furthermore, the Bettencourt opinion
suggested that if only a general objection is made, the matter is
not properly preserved for appeal. 51 In Bettencourt, however, de-
fense counsel orally objected at trial without stating the basis or
grounds. 52 In Grant, defense counsel did specifically object to iden-
tification testimony on the basis that it violated his client's consti-
tutional rights.53
The implication is that the manner in which an evidentiary
issue can be preserved for appeal is narrowed to include only an
objection on specifically articulated grounds. It is not enough to
object to a specific type of evidence, or to argue that admission of
certain evidence will violate specific rights. Instead, counsel must
object by stating the specific reason or reasons that the evidence is
inadmissible. Otherwise, the argument will be lost forever. In fact,
Grant has already twice been cited to stand for this proposition. 54
47. See State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972 (R.I. 1994).
48. Grant, 840 A.2d at 547.
49. Id.
50. State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I. 1999).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Grant, 840 A.2d at 547.
54. See Union Station Assocs. v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 192 (R.I. 2004);
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England, Inc. v. Rossi, 847 A.2d 286,
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CONCLUSION
The Grant decision impacts Rhode Island common law in two
ways. First, receiving stolen goods and obtaining money by false
pretenses are not lesser included offenses of robbery. Second, in
order to preserve an objection to the admission of evidence for ap-
pellate review, the precise reasons for the objection must be ar-
ticulated, otherwise the argument will be lost pursuant to the
"raise or waive" doctrine. This second determination may poten-
tially be reconsidered in a more difficult case. After all, despite
finding that the issue was not appealable, the court still deter-
mined that the defendant would not have won his argument. In a
case in which the defendant's rights appear to have been egre-
giously violated, this decision could come under scrutiny, or per-
haps be weakened by the extension of already recognized
exception to the "raise or waive" rule.55
Adam M. Ramos
293 (R.I. 2004).
55.
The "raise or waive" rule does not apply when: "(1) the error com-
plained of is not harmless, (2) the record is sufficient to permit a de-
termination of the issue, (3) the mistake is one of constitutional
import, and (4) counsel's failure to raise the issue is attributable to a
novel rule of law that counsel could not reasonably have known
about during the trial."
State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 1994).
2005]

Family Law. Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242 (R.I. 2004). The
"compelling reason test" is an improper standard of review to de-
termine whether it is in the best interest of a child for a divorced
parent, in actual custody of the child, to relocate outside of the
United States. Rather, a court should consider the factors set forth
by the American Law Institute to determine a child's best inter-
ests, but such factors should not be exhaustive.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Melanie and Robert Dupre were married in 1987.1 They first
came to Providence, Rhode Island in 1980 after living in French
Polynesia.2 Robert purchased property and rented apartments in
the city.3 According to Melanie, the revenue from Robert's apart-
ments was intended to enable the couple to return to Huahine.
4
Melanie was unhappy in New England and wished to return to
Huahine, but Robert did not wish to relocate because his business
had become quite successful.
5
In August 1999 Robert filed for divorce.6 A consent decree was
given that enabled Melanie to relocate with their two children to
Tahiti for the 1999-2000 academic year.7 The following year, an-
other decree was proposed for the 2000-2001 year providing that
both parents would alternate placement of the children in Rhode
Island, except for two months when Melanie could take them to
Huahine.8 On December 31, 2001 final judgment was entered for
their divorce. The parties could not agree on the primary place-
ment of the children in the 2001-2002 school year.9
Hearings for primary custody were held in October and No-
1. Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 245 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 245-46.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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vember 2001.10 A psychologist, Brian Hayden, Ph.D., testified that
in his opinion, it was in the best interests of the children to re-
main in physical custody of Melanie, rather than that of Robert.11
Doctor Hayden's opinion was that the children viewed Melanie as
the primary caregiver.12 Although Dr. Hayden believed Robert was
a good father, he noted that the children did not see much of him
when they lived with him, and were unable to communicate with
their mother during that time.1 3 He also commented that he be-
lieved Melanie's wish to return to Tahiti was not a desire, but a
need. 14 She testified that living in New England made her not only
unhappy, but physically ill.5
The trial court denied the relocation of Melanie with her chil-
dren under a best interests standard. The trial justice held that
Melanie failed to demonstrate a compelling reason for her to relo-
cate with her children to Huahine.16 Because there was no compel-
ling reason, the trial justice denied her custody. 7 Consequently,
the placement of the children was granted to Robert.18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately held that reloca-
tion of children should not be decided under a compelling reason
standard of review.19 The court began by reviewing the different
approaches of sister states toward relocation of parents. The tradi-
tional approach, still favored by some states, presumes that it is in
the best interest of the child not to relocate.20 Consequently, relo-
cating parents have to uphold a burden of proof in order to pre-
vail.21
One of two recently emerging trends by other states has cre-
ated a presumption in favor of relocation, either by statute or case
10. Id.
11. Id. at 247.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 248.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 262.
20. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
McAlister v. Patterson, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 1982).
21. Dupre, 857 A.2d at 249.
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law. 22 The other approach is a burden shifting approach, in which
the relocating parent suffers the initial burden of proving that it is
in the best interests of the child to relocate in good faith.23 Once
this burden has been met, the burden shifts to the non-relocating
parent to prove that the move is not in the best interests of the
child.24 In light of these varying standards, Justice Suttell empha-
sized that the overall pattern of developing these approaches is
demonstrating an effort away from the traditional approach
25
Turning to Rhode Island statutory law on relocation, Rhode
Island General Laws section 15-5-16(d)(1), Justice Suttell dis-
cussed its pertinent language: "the court shall provide for the rea-
sonable right of visitation by the natural parent not having
custody of the children, except upon the showing of cause why the
right should not be granted."26 Thus, the language of the statute
created no presumptions or standards regarding the relocation of
parents.
The court then discussed a litany of prior decisions, which
analyzed the application of the best interests standard for reloca-
tion. The only case that suggested a compelling reason standard
was Garrison v. Mulcahy.27 In Garrison, however, the court issued
an order without a full opinion. 28 Justice Suttell held that Garri-
son was a "less than compelling precedent" in light of the fact that
"[an order] is not the type of vehicle commonly utilized by the
court for pronouncing new standards ."29 The language of "com-
pelling reason" was first used by an expert witness in that case,
and the court simply agreed with his conclusion that it was not in
the best interest of the children to stay with the father, who may
22. See e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 19
(West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-5-13 (Michie 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.327(3)(a)2.a (West 2001); Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653,
658 (2003); In re Marriage of Burgess 913 P.2d 473, 478 (1996); Jaramillo v.
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 303 (N.M. 1991).
23. See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 230-31 (N.J. 2001); Ireland v.
Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998); Lavane v. Lavane, 201 A.2d 623
(N.Y. 1994).
24. Dupre, 857 A.2d at 249.
25. Id. at 250.
26. R.I. GEN. LAws §15-5-16(d)(1) (Supp. 2004).
27. 636 A.2d 732 (R.I. 1993).
28. Dupre 857 A.2d at 253 ("We first note that Garrison is not a full opin-
ion of the Court, but rather an order.").
29. Id.
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relocate out of the state.30 Consequently, in Dupre, the court was
not convinced that Garrison even stood for that precedent.
Because past case law had simply held that relocation was ei-
ther in the best interest of the child or not, without any standard
or presumptions, the court was compelled to turn to alternative
persuasive authorities. Particularly, the court gave attention to
the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dis-
solution 3l and the proposed Model Relocation Act of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. 32 From these two sources, the
court concluded that the following factors must be considered in
determining relocation:
The nature, quality and extent of involvement, and dura-
tion of child's relationship with the parent proposing to
relocate;
The reasonable likelihood that the relocation will enhance
the general quality of life for both the child and the par-
ent seeking the relocation;
The probable impact that the relocation will have on the
child's physical, educational, and emotional development;
The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
non-relocating parent and child through suitable visita-
tion arrangements;
The existence of extended family or other support sys-
tems available to the child in both locations;
Each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing relocation;
In cases of international relocation, whether the country
is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction; and
The Pettinato factors.33
30. Id.
31. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 2.17(4)(a) (American Law Institute 2002).
32. 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. §405 (1998).
33. Dupre, 857 A.2d at 242, 258-59. The Pettinato factors include:
The wishes of the child's parent or parents regarding the child's cus-
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In the case at bar, the court held that the trial court was cor-
rect in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to
live with Melanie.34 However, the court went on to find that the
lower court failed to determine whether this remained in their
best interests, in light of the relocation.35 Thus, some issues
needed consideration. The court emphasized that Melanie was al-
ready living in Huahine at the time of the divorce proceeding and
that she had voiced her desire to move during her marriage with
Robert.36 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the lower
court for further findings consistent with its opinion.
37
COMMENTARY
Relocation of children in post-divorce proceedings is contro-
versial. Consider the following consequences of Dupre: Melanie's
move to Huahine would effectively prevent any meaningful visita-
tion rights Robert was afforded. Robert would have to travel
around the world to see his children. It would be a great expense
for all involved.
The court recognized that there have been contradicting stud-
ies determining the effect that relocation has on children of di-
vorce. On the one hand, studies have shown that stability of
positive child development is more dependent upon the substan-
tody.
The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to ex-
press a preference.
The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parent or parents, the child's siblings, and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interest.
The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community.
The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The stability of the child's home environment.
The moral fitness of the child's parents.
The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate a close and
continuous parent-child relationship between the child and other
parent.
Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913-14 (R.I. 1990).
34. Dupre, 857 A.2d.at 262.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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tive relationship the child has with the primary parent than it
does with retaining consistent contact with the other parent.38
However, other social scientists claim that frequent contact with
both parents is the most important factor in the child's develop-
ment.39
The bottom line is this: there must be a determination that fo-
cuses on the best interests of the child. However, the issue of relo-
cation suggests a natural deviation from focusing on the child's
interests and a move toward the autonomy of parents. Evidence of
this phenomenon is in the A.L.I.'s Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution underlying policy itself: "a parent, like any other citi-
zen should be able to choose his or her place of residence, and that
the job of [child] rearing ... should not be made too financially or
emotionally burdensome to the parent who has the majority share
of custodial responsibility."40 On its face, the A.L.I. may not seem
the best advocate for best interests of the child; but perhaps we
can feel confident in the ability of the courts to provide for the
well-being of every child. For now, researchers continue to strug-
gle on the effects that relocation has on a child, and this debate
may continue indefinitely.
Importantly, these sociological studies and opinions by ex-
perts suggest another important theme: the acceptance by society
at large of new definitions of family. That is, how do we look at
modern family groupings, and how do these ideals affect a divorce
determination being made, presumably, in the best interest of the
child? Surely, current trends suggest that the judicial system will
have many more opportunities to examine these issues in the fu-
ture. As researchers continue to struggle on the effects of reloca-
tion on a child of divorce, the debate will continue accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a "compelling rea-
son" standard is inapplicable to determine whether relocation of a
child with the primary parent is in the best interests of the child.
The court looked to current trends in statutory construction and
38. Id. at 256.
39. Id. at 256.
40. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REcOM-
MENDATIONS § 2.17 cmt. D (American Law Institute 2002).
2005] SURVEY SECTION 895
case law from other jurisdictions, but unfortunately, found that
there is no dominant trend or standard among sister states that
address the issue of relocation. The court relied on the A.L.I.'s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and the proposed
Model Relocation Act of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers to supplement the factors considered on this matter.
Christopher J. Davidson

Products Liability Law. Clift v. Vose Hardware, 848 A.2d
1130 (R.I. 2004). In a products liability suit in which the product
that allegedly caused the injury is discarded, the plaintiffs claim
will not survive a motion for summary judgment unless affidavits
supporting the claim contain specific facts and evidence regarding
who actually sold and manufactured the product; mere conclusory
assertions and suppositions will not suffice.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Paul M. Clift, was an employee of Harvey In-
dustries, Inc.' In May of 1998, while at work, Mr. Clift was secur-
ing a storm door to a company vehicle with a bungee cord when
the cord gave way and struck his left eye.2 As a result, Clift lost
sight in that eye.3 After being treated for his injuries, Clift re-
turned to his place of employment to retrieve the cord which
caused the injuries.4 At that time he was informed that the cord
had been discarded. Mr. Clift stated that he believed the bungee
cord which caused his injuries was sold by defendant, Vose Hard-
ware, because prior to his injury he picked up similar bungee
cords for his employer at a Vose True Value Hardware store in
Woonsocket. 5 Additionally, after his injury, Clift inspected a
bungee cord which was bought from defendant Vose and concluded
that this cord was identical to the cord he was using when the in-
jury occurred. 6
On May 24, 2001, Mr. Clift and his wife filed an action in the
Rhode Island Superior Court alleging negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability against Mr. Clift's employer, Harvey In-
dustries, the alleged seller of the cord, Vose Hardware, and the
alleged manufacturer, T.W. Evans Cordage Co., Inc.7 The superior
1. Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc., 848 A.2d 1130, 1131 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1133.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1131-32.
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court dismissed plaintiffs' suit against his employer, Harvey In-
dustries, pursuant to the exclusivity provision of Rhode Island
General Laws section 28-29-20, because plaintiff received worker's
compensation benefits.8
Defendant Vose moved for summary judgment, alleging the
Clifts presented no evidence that Vose sold the cord to plaintiffs
employer, Harvey.9 Additionally, Vose asserted that plaintiffs also
offered no evidence that the cord in question was defective. 10
Thereafter, Cordage moved for summary judgment arguing that
plaintiffs had also failed to prove that the cord was manufactured,
designed or distributed by the company."
After examining the affidavits, pleadings and other evidence,
the superior court judge granted the summary judgment motions
of both defendants. 12 The judge ruled that plaintiffs could not es-
tablish any facts to support the claims that the bungee cord was
sold by Vose or manufactured by Cordage.' 3 The judge explained,
"[t]here are discovery techniques available to give plaintiff full op-
portunity to develop its case, and that just hasn't been done
here."14 Plaintiffs, Paul M. Clift and Susan L. Clift, appealed the
judgment of the superior court granting the defendants, Vose and
Cordage, motions for summary judgment. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The superior court judge granted summary judgment with re-
spect to both defendants because the plaintiffs could not establish
"any facts to support their claims that the bungee cord either was
sold by Vose or manufactured by Cordage." 16 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court agreed with the motion judge.17 The court ex-
plained that in a products liability case, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving causation.'8 The court went on to state that
8. Id. at 1132.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id.
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while "in some instances, circumstantial evidence may be used to
establish the identity of the manufacturer or the seller of the de-
fective product,"19 the evidence must be "reasonably probable ....
Mere speculation, guess, or conjecture is insufficient to establish
identification."20
In analyzing the appeal, the court held that plaintiff did not
present any "competent" evidence to connect either defendant to
the cord involved in the injury.21 The court noted that the affida-
vits submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment contained only "conclusory assertions and
suppositions" and additionally contradicted previous statements
made by Clift in which he admitted that "he was not sure where
the bungee cord was purchased and that he was merely assuming
that a coworker had purchased it from Vose." 22 The court also
stated it was immaterial that defendants did not submit any evi-
dence in support of their motions because Rule 56(b) of the Supe-
rior Court Rules of Civil Procedure plainly states that a party
against whom a claim is asserted "may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for summary judgment ... "23 For
the foregoing reasons, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed
the granting of defendants' motions for summary judgment.
COMMENTARY
In the current climate of tort reform and sensationalized me-
dia coverage of "excessive" personal injury awards, the courts have
become even more cognizant of the image of the judicial system as
a medium used by plaintiffs seeking to reap colossal verdicts from
corporate America. In response, it seems that some courts have
chosen to increase the plaintiffs burden particularly in the area of
strict products liability, which contravenes the rationales that un-
derlie the doctrine. The well settled goals of strict liability are risk
spreading, accident reduction and reduction of the plaintiffs bur-
den. In other words, this area of law was meant to hold manufac-
turers of unreasonably dangerous products liable for injuries
19. Id. (quoting Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 3.04[1] at 3-50).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1133.
22. Id.
23. Id.; R.I. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
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caused by their products because the manufacturers are best able
to absorb the cost of any injury. Additionally, forcing the manufac-
turers to pay for injuries resulting from an unreasonably danger-
ous product will incentivise manufacturers to make safer
products.
In this case the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
Plaintiffs affidavits, in which he stated he was familiar with and
had previously bought bungee cords from the defendant's store,
were "conclusory."24 It is arguable however that this issue should
have been decided on a motion for summary judgment but instead
should have gone to the jury as a question of fact. Yet, the court
stated that "the inferences that plaintiffs asked the court to
draw... were merely speculative."25 In affirming the granting of
defendants' motions for summary judgment the court makes clear
that in a products liability suit the product which allegedly caused
the injury must be preserved or the claim may never get to the
jury, thereby placing a higher burden on the plaintiff than was
originally intended in a products liability suit.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in a products li-
ability suit in which the product that allegedly caused the injury
is discarded, the plaintiffs claim will not survive a motion for
summary judgment unless affidavits supporting the claim contain
specific facts and evidence regarding who actually sold and manu-
factured the product; mere conclusory assertions and suppositions
will not suffice.
Stephanie M. Modica
24. Clift, 848 A.2d at 1133.
25. Id.
Property Law. Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827 (R.I.
2004). A row of trees may be found to be sufficiently similar to a
fence and therefore, may violate section 34-10-20 of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws even if they were planted for privacy reasons.
Furthermore, the remedy for violation of section 34-10-20 may in-
clude abatement of the fence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In November of 2000 Peter Bloomquist sought a zoning vari-
ance from the Charlestown zoning board to construct a second-
story addition to his home.' Bloomquist's neighbor, Cheryl
Dowdell, opposed the variance due to her belief that it would ob-
struct her view of the Atlantic Ocean. 2 For six months the
neighbors presented their conflicting arguments to the zoning
board of review on the merits of the addition. 3 As a result, the once
friendly relationship between the neighbors was destroyed. 4 In
May of 2001, one day after the zoning board granted the variance
request, Bloomquist planted four western arborvitae trees on the
property line between his and Dowdell's homes.5 The forty foot
trees obstructed Dowdell's view of the ocean and blocked light
from entering her second and third story windows. 6 The trees
caused Dowdell's home value to depreciate by as much as
$100,000.7 Dowdell brought an action in superior court alleging
that the four trees created a fence erected to exact revenge against
her and therefore violated Rhode Island General Laws section 34-
10-20.8 The superior court justice ruled that the trees were mali-
ciously planted in violation of section 34-10-20 and granted plain-
tiff injunctive relief ordering the trees to be removed or reduced to
1. Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827, 829 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id. at 829.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Dowdell v. Bloomquist, WC 2001-0617, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 85
(R.I. Super. June 28, 2002).
902 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.IO:901
six feet in height. 9 Bloomquist then appealed the decision contend-
ing that: (1) the trees did not constitute a fence in violation of sec-
tion 34-10-20; (2) even if the trees did constitute a fence under the
statute, the justice "erroneously granted relief in the face of testi-
mony that the trees serve a useful purpose of privacy for the de-
fendant[;]" and (3) the justice lacked the authority to award
injunctive relief for a violation of section 34-10-20.10
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island spite-fence statute provides that:
A fence or other structure in the nature of a fence which
unnecessarily exceeds feet (6') in height and is mali-
ciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying
the owners or occupants of adjoining property, shall be
deemed a private nuisance, and any owner or occupant
who injured, either in the comfort or enjoyment of his or
her estate thereby, may have an action to recover dam-
ages for the injury1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the statute
clearly allows for a row of trees to be considered a fence under the
spite-fence statute.12 The statute refers to a "fence or other struc-
ture in the nature of a fence ... ,"13 The court found that the posi-
tioning and size of the trees made them "fall well within the
statutory definition of a 'structure in the nature of a fence."' 14
The court held that the spite-fence statute is violated if a
fence is put up maliciously even if it was done for the purpose of
creating privacy.'5 The defendant argued that he planted the trees
for the beneficial purpose of creating privacy and therefore should
not be held in violation of the statute.16 The court recognized that
a fence maliciously installed for a useful purpose could sometimes
9. Dowdell, 847 A.2d at 828.
10. Id. at 830.
11. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-10-20 (Supp. 2004).
12. Dowdell, 847 A.2d at 831.
13. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-10-20 (Supp. 2004).
14. Dowdell, 847 A.2d at 830.
15. Id. at 831.
16. Id.
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leave a victim without remedy but stated that a "defendant
needed to provide more than just privacy as justification for the
fence." 17 The court reiterated that "[aiccepting privacy alone would
simply result in the statute being rendered meaningless and ab-
surd."18 Since the defendant only relied on privacy as a justifica-
tion for the fence, the court found that he violated the spite-fence
statute.
The final ruling by the court was that the spite-fence statute
allows for injunctive relief as an available remedy for a violation. 19
The defendant unsuccessfully tried to argue that the spite-fence
statute only provided for a monetary damages remedy.20 The court
agreed with the defendant that there is no common law right to
light and air but found that a violation of the spite-fence statute is
considered a private nuisance. 21 The court went on to find that eq-
uitable relief was an available remedy for a private nuisance. The
defendant also argued that the language of the statute limits the
remedy for a violation to damages. 22 The court found that the ex-
plicit language in the statute, "may have an action to recover
damages for the injury," merely allowed for the additional remedy
of damages and did not exclude injunctive relief.23 Therefore, the
court affirmed the superior court's ruling that the trees had to be
removed or cut to less than six feet in height.24
Justice Flanders's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Flanders concurred with the portion of the majority
decision finding that the spite-fence statute was violated but dis-
agreed with the majority that injunctive relief was available for a
violation.25 Flanders argued that "[clourts should not infer causes
of action and remedies that are not expressly provided for in a
statute such [as the spite-fence statute which] creates a right and
a remedy that was not available at common law."26 Flanders ar-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 832.
20. Id. at 831.
21. Id. at 832.
22. Id. at 833.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 833-34.
26. Id. at 835.
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gued that when the legislature provides a remedy, such as for
damages in the spite-fence statute, the court should not expand
the remedies made available. 2v He goes on to find that the major-
ity opinion uses cases to support its ruling that are "inapposite be-
cause they interpret either a statute, unlike section 34-10-20,
provid[ing] specifically for abatement of the offending struc-
ture... or they do not interpret a spite-fence statute at all."28
Flanders argued that the court is "require[d] to accord statutes
their plain and ordinary meaning, to strictly construe statutes
such as this one that grant rights not recognized at common law,
and to refrain from inferring causes of action and providing reme-
dies that are not contained in the express language of the stat-
ute."29 Therefore, Flanders argued that the superior court was
wrong in granting a type of relief that the spite-fence statute did
not authorize.
COMMENTARY
The issue of whether a row of trees may be considered a fence
within the meaning of the spite-fence statute was an issue of first
impression for the Rhode Island Supreme Court.30 The Dowdell
case now makes it clear that trees can be considered a fence like
structure and subject to the spite-fence statute. The court also
found that "where evidence of malicious intent plainly outweighs
the discounted benefit claimed by defendant, the court [can find]
defendant's actions to violate the spite-fence statute."31 This ruling
was required to ensure that section 34-10-20 did not become a
meaningless statute. Had the court ruled otherwise, defendants
would have been able to avoid liability under the statute by simply
stating that they built the fence for privacy reasons. This would
have been inconsistent with the obvious intent of the statute.
The third issue determined by the court was whether injunc-
tive relief is available to victims when the spite-fence statute has
been violated. By ruling that injunctive relief was an available
remedy the court expanded the remedies available under the
spite-fence statute. In Rhode Island, spite-fences were not consid-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 837.
29. Id. at 838.
30. Id. at 830.
31. Id. at 831.
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ered a private nuisance at common law and they did not become a
private nuisance until the spite-fence statute was enacted. 32 The
majority holds that the statute making spite-fences a private nui-
sance implies that equitable relief is available to victims. The
court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the statute spe-
cifically allows for victims to recover damages and makes no men-
tion of injunctive relief. Justice Flanders's dissent is far more
convincing and points out that "[dleeming the erection of a spite-
fence to constitute a private nuisance only suffices to establish the
perpetrator's civil liability for Violating the statute... it does not
speak to what civil remedy is available."33 He further points out
that "[ciourts should not infer causes of actions and remedies that
are not expressly provided for in a statute such as [the spite-fence
statute] that creates a right and a remedy that was not available
at common law."34 In Dowdell, the majority opinion seems to ig-
nore the wording of the statute while providing a remedy that is
not allowed under the spite-fence statute or common law.
The majority's attempt to use case law from other states is
unpersuasive because the cases either analyze statutes that are
dissimilar to section 34-10-20 in that they explicitly provide for
abatement of the fence or "they do not interpret a spite-fence stat-
ute at all. 35 Further, the court makes a serious mistake in analyz-
ing Rice v. Moorehouse,36 which it uses to support its ruling. In
Rice the Massachusetts court ruled that abatement was an avail-
able remedy for violation of the spite-fence statute and the Rhode
Island Supreme Court uses this as persuasive authority to show
that abatement is proper even if not mentioned in the statute.
However, Rice was not interpreting Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 49, section 21 (1994). Rather, Rice was decided using
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 348, sections 1-2 (1887)37, a
completely different statute than what the majority opinion of
Dowdell says was being analyzed.38 The actual statute used in de-
ciding the Rice case allows for abatement of the fence and is there-
32. Id. at 837.
33. Id. at 836.
34. Id. at 835.
35. Id. at 837.
36. Rice v. Moorehouse, 150 Mass. 482 (1890).
37. Id. at 483.
38. Dowdell, 847 A.2d at 836.
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fore not similar to the Rhode Island statute.3 9 Therefore, the
Dowdell majority opinion is based, at least in part, on erroneous
case law. It is difficult to understand how the majority could make
such an oversight in interpreting a case.
The majority opinion is lacking support and goes against the
well settled principal that courts should read statutes narrowly
and not expand the remedies made available by the legislature.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a row of trees can
constitute a fence for purposes of the spite-fence statute section
34-10-20 and that privacy alone could not justify maliciously put-
ting up a fence. Further, the Court found that injunctive relief is
allowed under section 34-10-20. Therefore, defendant Bloomquist
was found to have violated section 34-10-20 by putting a row of
large trees up on the property line between his and the plaintiffs
home. The remedy given to the plaintiff by the court was an order
for the abatement of the trees.
Richard Moskowitz
39. See Rice, 150 Mass. at 483.
Tort Law. DeLaire v. Kaskel, 842 A.2d 1052 (R.I. 2004). Ani-
mal control officers are not barred from bringing negligence ac-
tions against property owners under the "public safety officer's
rule," which prohibits firefighters and police officers from bringing
suit for injuries sustained when confronting the ordinary, foresee-
able risks inherent in their lines of work. Animal control officers
fall outside of the two policy rationales for the rule - primary as-
sumption of the risk and fundamental concepts of justice as to
double compensation - because they differ from fire fighters and
police officers as to their compensation, training, benefits, duties,
and the statutory protections afforded them.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, David DeLaire, was an animal control officer in
the town East Greenwich.' On February 16, 2000, he was called to
Rick and Louise Kaskel's home to remove a stray cat.2 DeLaire
stated that he had previously visited the home on three other oc-
casions, on calls to restrain the same stray cat.3 After driving onto
defendants' property and while exiting his vehicle, DeLaire
slipped and fell on a patch of snow and sustained a broken arm.
4
Delaire nonetheless was able to retrieve the cat, which defendants
had caught, and sought medical attention later in the day.5
On May 25, 2001, DeLaire filed suit against the Kaskels in
the Superior Court of Rhode Island, alleging negligence and seek-
ing damages for personal injury.6 The Kaskels moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs suit was barred by the
"public safety officer's rule."7 The trial justice, after a hearing,
granted the defendants' motion and entered judgment in their fa-
vor.8 Plaintiff subsequently appealed. 9
1. DeLaire v. Kaskel, 842 A.2d 1052, 1053 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1054.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in
granting the defendants summary judgment.o He claimed that
the public safety officer's rule did not apply to him because he was
neither a police officer nor a firefighter. 11 Additionally, DeLaire
argued that the rule did not apply as he was not responding to an
emergency of the magnitude or type to which police officers and
firefighters respond.12 Thus, the plaintiff presented the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court with a question of first impression: does the
public safety officer's rule apply to animal control officers? 3 Stat-
ing that the court has never expressly applied the rule to public
employees other than police officers and firefighters, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court reversed the trial justice's order of summary
judgment.14 The court then remanded the case to the superior
court based on the holding that the two historical rationales that
support application of the public safety officer's rule do not apply
to animal control officers." The court then held that animal con-
trol officers are exempted from the rule and may seek damages for
injuries resulting from landowners' ordinary negligence.16
1. Primary Assumption of the Risk
The first rationale that has traditionally supported applica-
tion of the public safety officer's rule is the doctrine of primary as-
sumption of risk.1 7 This doctrine states that firefighters and police
officers assume the ordinary, foreseeable risks inherent in their
lines of work, which include responding to dangerous situations,
as a matter of law, and as such are precluded from suing land-
owners to recover for injuries sustained when confronting these
foreseeable risks.18 Although the court explained primary assump-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1056.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1055 (citing Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 38-39
(R.I. 1989)).
18. DeLaire, 842 A.2d at 1055 (citing Mignone, 556 A.2d at 39).
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tion of the risk as a past-supporting rationale for application of
the public safety officer's rule, the court did not explain how this
rationale might support or oppose plaintiffs arguments on appeal.
2. Fundamental Concepts of Justice
The primary focus of the court's analysis was one of "funda-
mental concepts of justice."19 The court stated that "because the
public compensates police officers and firefighters for confronting
the dangerous situations that they may face, . .. [these] officials
should not be allowed to seek compensation for the negligence that
creates the need for their services in the first place."20 Otherwise,
the court stated, such officials would be allowed a form of double
compensation. 21 Defendants argued that plaintiff was similar
enough to firefighters and police officers (as he drove a police vehi-
cle, carried a police issued firearm, was a police constable, and re-
ported to a police sergeant) to also be ineligible for this type of
double compensation. 22
The court, however, found that the plaintiff animal control of-
ficer was distinct enough from police officers and firefighters so as
to fall outside the ambit of the rule. Thus, animal control officers
could be allowed to pursue a negligence action for damages from
personal injury against the defendant landowners. 23 The court
based its distinction upon the difference in duties, training, bene-
fits, and compensation between animal control officers and police
officers and firefighters. 24 Additionally, the court highlighted the
statutory protection allowed police officers and firefighters under
Rhode Island General Laws section 45-19-1(a), which permits
these employees to receive their full salary as well as medical ex-
penses if injured in the line of duty,25 while animal control officers
may only recover for such injuries under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act 26 section of the Rhode Island General Laws.27 This protec-
19. Id. (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 438 (R.I.
1993) (quoting Mignone, 556 A.2d at 39)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19-1(a) (Supp. 2004).
26. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-29-2(4) (1997).
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tion, in addition to the larger salary paid to police officers, police
training academy preparation and the protections provided by the
Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights 28 led the court to find
that animal control officers are relatively under compensated
when compared with police officers and firefighters.29 Thus, the
court held that animal control officers should not be precluded
"from seeking redress from private landowners when they are in-
jured as a result of the landowner's ordinary negligence."30
3. Justice Flanders's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Flanders's dissenting opinion, running more than
twice the length of the majority opinion, did not accord the weight
that the majority did to the job titles, benefits, training, and statu-
tory protections enjoyed by the different public safety officers in
question. 31 Instead, Justice Flanders focused on the underlying
purpose of the rule as found in the primary assumption of the risk
and fundamental public policy considerations. He stated that
these two doctrines together prevent certain classes of public
safety officers from recovering for the very negligent acts that cre-
ate the need for their employment in the first place, and that the
public safety officer's rule was created to avoid the unfairness that
would be inherent in such double compensation. 32
Justice Flanders's dissent also focused on the result that the
majority's rule will have on homeowners in need of emergency aid.
He noted that another public policy served by the rule has been
that of "encouraging homeowners ... to freely solicit assistance
from public-safety officers without fear that they will be sued by
such officers if they injure themselves on the taxpayer's prop-
erty."33 Now that animal control officers are exempt from coverage
by the rule, taxpayers may be deterred from calling for a public
safety officer when they are in need of assistance due to "fear [of]
facing tort lawsuits or increased insurance premiums if the wrong
27. Id. at 1056.
28. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28.6 et seq. (1997).
29. DeLaire, 842 A.2d at 1056.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1057-58.
33. Id. at 1058.
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type of public safety officer responds to their call for help."34
Justice Flanders found that animal control officers, like police
officers and firefighters, also assume the normal risks inherent in
their lines of work and respond to emergency calls for help, just
like these other officers. 35 He stated that in this case, the risk of
slipping and falling on snow when responding to a homeowner's
call for help with a stray animal was a very foreseeable risk and
that the plaintiff was already paid by taxpayers to encounter just
such a risk.36 Additionally, Justice Flanders noted that the plain-
tiff DeLaire is not totally without recourse, as he can recover un-
der worker's compensation. 37
The dissent also believed that the plaintiff in this particular
case should be barred from double-recovery since he held himself
out to the public as an actual police officer where he "dressed like
a policeman, worked out of an office in the police station, .. . drove
a police van... [and] was vested with arrest powers, carried a
firearm and wore a constable's badge."38 Justice Flanders stated
that "he should be estopped by his conduct from asserting that the
rule does not apply to him," implying that the rule might not
really apply to this particular officer, but his behavior should es-
top him from rebutting the defense.39
COMMENTARY
As Justice Flanders's dissent points out, the outcome of the
majority's rule is that the public in need of assistance must now be
on alert as to whether an actual police officer or firefighter re-
sponds to a call for help, in which case the taxpayer is protected
from tort lawsuits. On the other hand, if some other public safety
officer might respond, instead leaving the taxpayer vulnerable to
suit and potentially dissuading the same from calling for help in
the first place.
Part of the weakness of the rule and its exclusions is that
there are no clear lines as to when a police officer, firefighter, dog
officer, or other public safety officer might respond to a public call
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1059.
36. Id. at 1060.
37. Id. at 1058.
38. Id. at 1061.
39. Id.
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for help. Both the majority and dissent cite Sobanski v. Donahue40
as a case in which the public safety officer's rule did apply to a po-
lice officer who was barred from suing a landlord for injuries re-
sulting from a dog bite.41 Justice Flanders might ask why the tax-
paying public should have to concern themselves with who re-
sponds to a call for help (be it police officer or dog officer) when
they are paying the salaries of all public safety officers.
The majority's rule in this case takes that puzzlement one
step further in providing a truly bizarre end result: under the ma-
jority's rule, if a police officer is bitten by a dog on a homeowner's
property, a risk he or she is arguably not necessarily paid to face,
he cannot sue the homeowner. However, if the homeowner cor-
rectly calls the animal control officer for assistance with his or her
dog, the very public official most properly paid to face the obvi-
ously foreseeable risk of animal bites inherent in his or her day to
day job can sue the homeowner if bitten. Surely, this is nonsensi-
cal at best. The lesson to take away from the majority here is un-
der no circumstances call the animal control officer or else you, as
the tax paying homeowner, may easily get bitten back in a very
costly fashion.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that animal control of-
ficers are not covered by the "public safety officer's rule" which
prohibits certain public employees from bringing negligence and
other tortious claims against landowners for injuries sustained
when responding to emergency calls for help. In this case, the
plaintiff animal control officer may pursue damages for injuries
sustained from a slip and fall when responding to defendant's call
for help with a stray cat.
Esme Noelle DeVault
40. 792 A.2d 57 (R.I. 2002).
41. DeLaire, 842 A.2d at 1054, 1060.
Tort Law. Konar v. PFL Life Insurance Co., 840 A.2d 1115
(R.I. 2004). In Rhode Island, the "Independent Contractor Rule",
which releases the employer of an independent contractor from li-
ability stemming from the negligent acts of that contractor, is not
affected by section 425 of the Restatement (Second) Torts. How-
ever, given the appropriate facts, the issue may be re-visited in
the future. Also, a Plaintiffs complaint of premises liability must
contain more than a general claim for negligence, in order to give
the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of negli-
gence claim being asserted.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In June 1995, Dennis DePalma attacked and injured the
plaintiff, Bryan D. Konar, outside of Newport Mall.' PFL Life In-
surance Company (PFL), the owner of Newport Mall, had con-
tracted with National Development Asset Management of New
England (National Development) to be the on-site manager.2 Na-
tional Development had a contract with the Rhode Island Bureau
of Investigation and Protection, Ltd. (RIBI) to provide security
services at the mall.3
Plaintiff brought suit against PFL alleging negligent failure
to provide security. 4 The plaintiffs complaint stated that he was
injured when "a male assailant, known to the defendant... to
pose an immediate threat of bodily harm to the plaintiff was al-
lowed to remain on the [mall] premises" and that his injuries were
a "direct and proximate result of. . . the defendant's, its' [sic]
agents, servants and/or employees [sic] negligent failure to pro-
vide security. . . ."5 Defendant PFL then filed a third-party com-
plaint against National Development, which in turn stated a
fourth-party complaint for contribution and indemnification
against DePalma and RIBI. Subsequently, RIBI asserted a cross-
1. Konar v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 840 A.2d 1115, 1116 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id. at 1117.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1119.
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claim against DePalma for contribution and indemnification.6
The Rhode Island Superior Court granted PFL's motion for
summary judgment finding that RIBI was the party responsible
for patrolling the mall when Konar was attacked; and thus, any
liability on the part of RIBI could not be imputed to PFL pursuant
to the independent contractor rule.7 The superior court further
noted that "this complaint is not one sounding in. .. premises li-
ability which would warrant a different analysis."8 Plaintiff ap-
pealed. 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Despite Rhode Island's liberal pleading rule,10 the "majority of
[the Rhode Island Supreme Court was] not willing to overlook the
overly broad, scatter-shot style of pleading on the part of the
plaintiff in this case to allow him to proceed on a premises liability
claim."" The Court stated that the plaintiffs complaint did not in-
clude a claim for premises liability, but rather only a general
claim for negligence. 12 Under premises liability law in Rhode Is-
land, landowners must "exercise reasonable care for the safety of
persons reasonably expected to be on the premises.., including
an obligation to protect against the risks of a dangerous condition
existing on the premises, provided the landowner knows of, or by
the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered, the danger-
ous condition."' 3 Furthermore, a landowner can delegate the duty
of performance to an independent contractor; however, the land-
owner cannot avoid liability for non-performance of that duty.14 In
contrast, the trial justice, in granting summary judgment for the
defendant, applied the independent contractor rule as it applies to
a general negligence claim. 15 Under this version of the independ-
6. Id. at 1117.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1117, 1120.
9. Id.
10. See R.I. SuP. CT. R. 8(a)(1) (requiring that a claim for relief must con-
tain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief').
11. Konar, 840 A.2d at 1119.
12. Id. at 1118-19.
13. Id. at 1118 (quoting Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, Inc., 820
A.2d 929, 935 (R.I. 2003)).
14. Id. at 1118.
15. Id. at 1119.
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ent contractor rule, "a party who employs an independent contrac-
tor generally will not be liable for the negligence of that contrac-
tor."16 Although there are exceptions to this independent
contractor rule, none of the exceptions are applicable in this
case.
17
When making the determination that the complaint did not
set forth a claim for premises liability, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court focused on how the complaint only alleged "negligent failure
to provide security" and did not mention the phrase "premises li-
ability" or "the underpinning of a premises liability claim." 8 The
court acknowledged that a complaint need not state the precise le-
gal theory; however, the complaint must still give "the opposing
party fair and adequate notice of the type of claim being as-
serted."1 9 Because the complaint only generally mentioned the
word "negligence," the complaint lacked sufficient specificity to
put the opposing party on notice of the type of negligence claim be-
ing asserted.20
Additionally, the court also declared that it would not sua
sponte apply premises liability law when reviewing an appeal from
a summary judgment on a "completely distinct negligence claim."21
The court reasoned that the motion justice's ruling was conclusive
because the plaintiff failed to challenge the motion justice's "clas-
sification of the claim as a general claim for negligence."22 The
plaintiff, as the appealing party, does not get "a second bite at the
apple," and as a result, the court limited its review to whether it
was an error to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant
on a general claim for negligence. 23
Recognizing that the exceptions to the independent contractor
rule were not applicable in the case at bar, plaintiff urged the
16. Id. at 1117.
17. Id. For example, a party would be liable for the acts of its independ-
ent contractor if the independent contractor was hired "to carry out a duty to
the public that is set out in a statute or ordinance" or if the independent con-
tractor is performing "inherently dangerous work." Id. at 1117-18.
18. Id. at 1119.
19. Id. at 1118.
20. Id. at 1119 (quoting Hendrick v. Hendrick, 755 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I.
2000)).
21. Id. at 1121.
22. Id. at 1120.
23. Id. at 1120-21.
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Court to adopt section 425 of the Restatement (Second) Torts in
order to prevent business owners from escaping liability by hiring
independent contractors. 24 Section 425 states that:
One who employs an independent contractor to maintain
in safe condition land which he holds open to the entry of
the public as his place of business, or a chattel which he
supplies for others to use for his business purposes or
which he leases for immediate use, is subject to the same
liability for physical harm caused by the contractor's neg-
ligent failure to maintain the land or chattel in reasona-
bly safe condition, as though he had retained its
maintenance in his own hands.25
However, the court declined to adopt section 425 of the Re-
statement because the facts of this case did not warrant its appli-
cation.26 In reaching the decision not to adopt this section of the
Restatement, the court reasoned that section 425 applies only to
premises liability claims and does not affect the independent con-
tractor rule.2 7
Consequently, the court denied plaintiffs appeal and affirmed
summary judgment in favor of defendants pursuant to the inde-
pendent contractor rule because the complaint failed to set forth a
claim for premises liability.28
The Dissent
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Flanders and Justice
Flaherty succinctly stated that "if ever there was a premises liabil-
ity case, this is it."29 The dissenters contended that the plaintiffs
complaint includes a claim for premises liability because it "ade-
quately alleged a breach of defendant's duty as owner of a New-
port shopping mall to provide safe premises for members of the
24. Id. at 1118.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 425 (1965) (emphasis added).
26. Konar, 840 A.2d at 1121. The Rhode Island Supreme Court did state
that "[g]iven the right facts and circumstances, which are not present here,
this Court may revisit the issues of § 425 as they pertain to premises liabil-
ity." Id.
27. Id. at 1121.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1126.
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invited public."30 To support this contention, the dissent explained
that "no magic words are required to state a claim," merely a short
plain statement that gives the opposing party notice of the type of
claim being asserted is sufficient. 31 Furthermore, the dissent
found it irrelevant that the plaintiffs complaint did not mention
the phrase "premises liability" because a landowner is in the "best
position to protect against harm" and therefore owes a duty to a
business invitee to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the
safety of its premises. 32
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent also relied upon the
idea that the independent contractor rule should not apply to
commercial property owners who invite members of the public on
their premises because a landowner should not be able to evade its
duty "by contracting with a third party."33 The dissent advocates
the adoption and application of section 425 of the Restatement as
a way of ensuring that commercial landowners are held responsi-
ble for providing safe premises for invitees.34 Thus, the dissenting
justices would reverse and remand the case for trial to determine
if PFL breached its duty to the plaintiff to maintain the premises
in a reasonably safe condition because the independent contractor
rule should not "serve to insulate the mall owner from liability."35
COMMENTARY
In light of the liberal pleading rule in Rhode Island, the ma-
jority's holding in this case is curious. Complaints need only con-
tain a short and plain statement that serves to afford the opposing
party adequate notice of the claims alleged. In this case, the ma-
jority seems to be demanding a great deal more specificity in
pleadings than is required under Rhode Island law. The dissent-
ing opinion accurately assessed the plaintiffs complaint and de-
30. Id. at 1121-22.
31. Id. at 1122.
32. Id. at 1123. The dissent also lists a string of cases from other jurisdic-
tions that have held that "a commercial property owner's failure to protect an
invitee from the criminal acts of third persons or the failure to provide 'secu-
rity' to a business invitee may... fall within the duty of the landowner... to
keep the premises reasonably safe for the purposes of the invitation." Id. at
1124.
33. Id. at 1125.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1126.
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termined that at the very least, the complaint "sounded in prem-
ises liability" because of the duty a landowner has to its invitees to
provide reasonably safe premises.
Furthermore, public policy concerns would seem to advocate
for the adoption of section 425 of the Restatement and the rejec-
tion of the independent contractor rule. It is senseless to allow a
commercial landowner to avoid liability by simply hiring inde-
pendent contractors to provide security on its premises, as is the
case under the independent contractor rule. Undoubtedly, a land-
owner who invites the public onto its premises for business pur-
poses possesses a duty to ensure that the premises are maintained
in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise reasonable care in
protecting the public from harm. Anything short of this duty need-
lessly shields a landowner from liability while still allowing the
landowner to reap the benefits of having the invited public visit its
premises for business purposes.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed plain-
tiffs appeal declaring that it was unwilling "to look past the am-
biguous state of the pleadings" and "the motion justice's specific
conclusion that plaintiff did not assert a premises liability
claim."36 Consequently, summary judgment in favor of defendant
was affirmed pursuant to the independent contractor rule under a
general negligence claim and the court rejected the adoption of
section 425 of the Restatement (Second) Torts.
Jamie M. Landry
36. Id. at 1120-21.
Tort Law. Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103
(R.I. 2004). Owners and possessors of property have an affirmative
duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons reasona-
bly expected to be on the premises. This duty includes an obliga-
tion to protect against the risks of a dangerous condition existing
on the premises, provided the landowner knows of, or by the exer-
cise of reasonable care would have discovered, the dangerous con-
dition. Also, without a satisfactory explanation that a report
mandated by corporate policy never existed, the jury is permitted
to infer that the production of such a report would have adverse
consequences for the corporate party.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After an afternoon of shopping on September 13, 1997, Vir-
ginia and Richard Mead stopped at the Papa Razzi Restaurant in
Cranston, Rhode Island, for some much needed nourishment.' By
the time the Meads finished dining, the restaurant had become
much more crowded than when they arrived, and "the establish-
ment bustled with activity."2 The Meads made their way to the
door; Virginia Mead following behind her husband.3 At that point,
things took an unexpected, and unfortunate turn for the couple.
Virginia Mead's foot slipped out from under her, and she fell to the
floor of the restaurant, landing on her right knee.4 Richard Mead
came immediately to his wife's aid, and an ambulance was called.
5
As the Meads awaited medical assistance, both Richard and Vir-
ginia noticed a puddle of liquid on the floor close to where Virginia
Mead had lost her footing.6 A staff member of the restaurant took
some information from the Meads, but did not discuss the incident
with the couple at that time.7 The slip and fall at the Papa Razzi
Restaurant resulted in a fracture to Virginia Mead's kneecap,
1. Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103, 1105 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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which required surgery and rehabilitation.8
Virginia and Richard Mead filed a negligence action against
Papa Razzi Restaurant, and its parent organization claiming the
negligence of the restaurant caused their injuries. 9 A jury trial
commenced on September 3, 2002, where the Meads testified, as
did a loss prevention manager from the restaurant's corporate
company, in support of their claim. 10 When testifying about the
spill on the floor, neither of the Meads were able to offer evidence
as to what the liquid was, where it had come from, or how long it
had been on the floor." However, both testified that the liquid ap-
peared clear, and that it was located in the area where Virginia
Mead had fallen.12 Their testimony also described the area as a
common walkway used by customers and employees of the restau-
rant. They further testified that they both had observed that sev-
eral employees carried trays and pitchers in the walkway on that
evening.13
The loss prevention manager, Karen Eaton, testified as to two
corporate policies in effect at the time of Virginia Mead's fall. The
first policy required that an incident report be prepared in con-
junction with any incidents that occurred in its restaurants. 14
Eaton's testimony revealed that with a slip and fall, "the standard
incident report contained information about the cause of the fall,
the identification of any employees involved, and the condition of
the floor."15 More importantly, Eaton testified that corporate pol-
icy was to retain copies of these reports.' 6 The second policy man-
dated a sanitation checklist be prepared by the restaurant staff
throughout the course of the day, recording the cleaning activities
undertaken by the staff.'7 Within two days of Virginia Mead's fall,
Eaton was personally notified, however she could not explain why
8. Id.
9. Id. Richard Mead also sought compensation for the loss of his wife's
comfort, society and consortium. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Eaton was not aware of any policy that required these sanitation
checklists be retained. Id. at 1106.
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neither of the two reports were available to the Meads when re-
quested during discovery.' 8
The testimony of the Meads and Eaton made up the plaintiffs'
case in chief. Following the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved
for judgment as a matter of law, and the trial justice granted the
motion.19 In doing so, the trial justice stated there was "no compe-
tent evidence before [the] jury to give any indication other than
rank speculation that a six inch pool of liquid was occasioned by a
negligent act of the defendants' agent."20 The trial justice found
that: (1) the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient for a jury to find
that employees of the restaurant were responsible for the spill;
and (2) if the spill resulted from a customer, the evidence was in-
sufficient for a jury to find the defendants had the opportunity to
receive notice of the spill. 21 Finally, the trial justice reasoned that
"because our case law clearly indicates that premises liability is
not an insurer of the safety of the public, [the court was] con-
strained to grant the motion and direct a verdict to the defen-
dant[s]."22 The Meads filed separate notices of appeal. 23
BACKGROUND
On appeal, the Meads argued that the trial justice erred by
failing to draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. First, they
argued that the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient for
the jury to find that it was "more probable than not that employ-
ees of Papa Razzi themselves had caused the liquid to accumulate
on the floor."24 The Meads further argued that notice is not re-
quired if the unsafe condition was created by an employee of the
restaurant.25 The plaintiffs' final contention was that there was
evidence of spoliation26of the incident report, which warranted an
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. All parties were ordered to appear before the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court to show cause why the issues on appeal should not be decided
summarily. Following oral argument on November 13, 2003, the court deter-
mined that cause had not been shown and the case would be decided at that
time. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The doctrine of spoliation provides that "the deliberate or negligent
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adverse inference against the defendants. 27
The defendants asserted on appeal that the Mead's claims of
negligence were "speculative at best."28 Because the plaintiffs
failed to provide any evidence relating to the origin and nature of
the liquid, and the length of time the liquid was on the floor, the
defendants argued that there was no evidence that the defendants
were ever put on notice.29 The defendants argued that notice is a
required element in a premises liability negligence action, unless
there is unequivocal evidence that a dangerous condition existed
on the premises, or that the condition was caused by an em-
ployee. 30 With respect to the incident reports, the defendants ar-
gued that their failure to produce the reports was not evidence of
spoliation because there was no evidence that the reports were
ever created, or subsequently destroyed.31
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
After first recognizing instances where an injured plaintiff
has failed to meet their burden of proving a business owner's neg-
ligence because of a lack of evidence relating to the length of time
a dangerous condition existed, or whether the owner knew or
should have known of such a condition, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that a "plaintiff must introduce evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant more probably
than not was negligent."32 The court then cited a prior holding
which recognized that evidence that an employee of a defendant
was in the immediate location just prior to the accident was suffi-
cient to raise a jury question as to whether or not the defendant
was on notice of the condition.33 Similarly, the court noted that
when evidence is presented that the defendant caused the danger-
ous condition, notice may be presumed. 34 The court then assessed
destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise to an
inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party." Tan-
crelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000).
27. Mead, 840 A.2d at 1106.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1106-07.
32. Id. at 1107.
33. Id. at 1107-08 (citing DeRobbio v. Stop & Shop Supermarket, 756
A.2d 209, 212 (R.I. 2000) (per curiam)).
34. Id. at 1108.
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the evidence that the plaintiffs had presented in their case. This
evidence "clearly indicated that a puddle of liquid was seen near
the accident site, and that defendants' busy employees were in the
walkway where Mead's fall occurred."35 Even though the Meads
had not presented conclusive evidence relating to the nature or
origin of the liquid, the court opined that the evidence presented,
coupled with the circumstances surrounding the defendants' fail-
ure to produce the incident report required by corporate policy,
created issues of fact that should not have been kept from the
jury.3 6
The court went on to discuss the spoliation doctrine, and its
applicability to the case. Little merit was found in the defendants'
argument that there was no evidence of spoliation because there
was no evidence of the report ever being prepared, even though
there was evidence of a mandated policy for doing so. 37 The court
reasoned to allow defendants to benefit from their own unex-
plained failure to preserve and produce relevant information
would be something the court would not condone. 38 Because there
was testimony presented by the plaintiffs that the defendants
prepared and maintained such incident reports in line with corpo-
rate policy, the question of whether or not the report was prepared
was a question of fact for the jury to decide. 39 The court explained
further that "without a satisfactory explanation that such a report
never existed, the jury should be permitted to infer that its pro-
duction would have had adverse consequences for defendants....
[The court] decline[s] to place the burden on the plaintiffs to prove
that an unpropitious report was destroyed by defendants in an-
ticipation of trial."40
The court recognized the difficult task plaintiffs often face in
proving negligence in slip and fall cases because the defendant is
rarely ever going to admit liability.41 The court found that the
Meads faced an even more challenging task because of the defen-
dants failure to produce the incident report which may have been
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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helped establish the defendants' negligence.42 Notwithstanding
this "handicap," the court held that evidence produced by the
Meads about the procedures surrounding documenting and retain-
ing reports of incidents that occurred at their restaurants, was
such that a jury could infer that there was a report, and that it
was damaging to the defendants. 43 For this reason, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that the trial justice "impermissibly re-
solved evidentiary inferences in favor of the defendants that were
more properly suited for [ I the jury .... [The trial justice] erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants."44
COMMENTARY
While this case produced two opinions, both the per curiam
opinion and Justice Flanders's concurrence make the same point.
The spoliation doctrine was what prevented the Mead's lawsuit
from being spoiled. Even the per curiam opinion makes it clear
that the evidence of the liquid alone was not be enough to defeat a
directed verdict. It was this evidence "coupled with the circum-
stances of defendants' failure to produce a policy-mandated inci-
dent report" that created factual issues to be decided by the jury.45
Mead brings forth the importance the spoliation doctrine of-
ten plays in civil litigation. It is important to note that while spo-
liation may provide the vehicle for a plaintiff to overcome a motion
for a directed verdict, as was seen in Mead, there are no guaran-
tees that the jury will be sensitive to the plaintiffs situation.
When evidence of spoliation is presented, the jury may infer that
the evidence was adverse to the defendant's case. If the defendant
presents evidence that the spoliation was negligent, or done in the
normal course of business, the jury may not wish to make any in-
42. Id. 1108-09.
43. Id. at 1109.
44. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Flanders showed less sympathy
for the challenges faced by plaintiffs in slip and fall actions: "The bottom lineis that, no matter how difficult it may be to prove a slip-and-fall case, we
should not allow juries to speculate that, just because somebody slipped and
fell, the defendant or its agent must be responsible." Id. (Flanders, J., concur-
ring). Justice Flanders tied his horse to the spoliation doctrine in concurring
with the per curium decision: "[Blut for the application of the spoliation doc-
trine, I do not believe the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to specu-
late about who caused the spill... and how long it was there before the
injury occurred." Id.
45. Id. at 1108.
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ferences against the defendants. If the spoliated evidence was the
sole basis for the plaintiffs claim, and the jury decides not to
make an adverse inference, the plaintiff may be left with no re-
dress to his injuries. Moreover, when a defendant is aware that
the adverse inference is not mandatory, and he is able to provide a
believable explanation, he may find it in his best interest to see
that the evidence never makes it to the courtroom. Due to these
shortcomings in the current spoliation doctrine, it has been sug-
gested that Rhode Island adopt an independent tort for the spolia-
tion of evidence in civil litigation. 46 An independent tort would
help to maintain the integrity of the Rhode Island judiciary by as-
suring an injured plaintiff is not denied the right of redress for
another's wrong. Similarly, independent liability would further
the interests of the injured parties, and provide added deterrence
for those who may be in a position to spoliate evidence.
47
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs evi-
dence of spoliation by the defendants prevented the trial justice
from granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. The
evidence of spoliation, along with scant evidence relating to a
puddle of liquid on the floor, presented questions of material fact
as to whether the defendant was on notice of the liquid. Evidence
that the defendants' corporate policy mandated the preparation
and maintenance of incident reports was sufficient for a jury to in-
fer that because the reports were not provided to the plaintiffs, the
information therein was adverse to the defendants' case. The deci-
sion of the superior court to grant the defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict was reversed, and the record was remanded to the
superior court. The Meads' claim against Papa Razzi remains
alive.
T. Patrick Gumkowski
46. See T. Patrick Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Is-
land Judicial System and Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spo-
liation: Why an Independent Cause of Action for the Spoliation of Evidence is
the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 795 (2005).
47. Id.
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Tort Law/Contract Law. Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Washington
Trust Co. of Westerly, 840 A.2d 1099 (R.I. 2004). There is no im-
plied duty restricting a bank's internal use of a customer's loan in-
formation when considering another customer's loan application.
Furthermore, a civil conspiracy claim requires a valid underlying
intentional tort theory.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case involved an appeal by the plaintiffs, Read & Lundy,
Inc. ("R&L") and Clifford McFarland (McFarland), from a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, The Washington
Trust Company of Westerly (Washington Trust).1 More specifi-
cally, R&L and McFarland alleged that the motion justice improp-
erly ruled that summary judgment should be entered in favor of
Washington Trust on its breach of contract, tortious interference
with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy claims.2 R&L and
McFarland also claimed that the motion justice erroneously con-
cluded that the statute of limitations had tolled on their claim for
violation of Rhode Island's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 3
This litigation had a long and complex history, including an
appeal by R&L and McFarland to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in a related case, McFarland v. Brier.4 In that case, R&L
and McFarland filed an action against defendants Dennis Bibeau
(Bibeau), Michael Brier (Brier), his accounting firm, Michael Brier
& Company, and Consigned Systems, Inc. (CSI), alleging tortious
interference with contractual relationships, misappropriation of
trade secrets, breach of professional duty through the illegal dis-
closure of confidential information, and interference with a pro-
spective business advantage and trade disparagement. 5 The
1. Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Washington Trust Co. of Westerly, 840 A.2d
1099, 1101 (R.I. 2004).
2. Id. at 1101-02.
3. Id. at 1003. Rhode Island's Uniform Trade Secrets Act is contained
within R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 6-41-1 - 41-11 (Supp. 2004).
4. 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001). For a survey of McFarland, see 7 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 403, 479 (2002).
5. Id. at 609.
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principals of CSI were Bibeau and Brier.6 Bibeau was a former
R&L employee who had tried unsuccessfully to purchase the com-
pany from McFarland, the owner of R&L. 7 Bibeau and Brier's
business relationship began during the attempted buyout when
Bibeau, while serving as president of R&L, hired Brier's account-
ing firm to assist him with the acquisition of the company.8 How-
ever, when Bibeau failed to make the required payments,
McFarland, acting pursuant to the buyout agreement, removed
him as president of the company. 9 The buyout was never com-
pleted and Bibeau resigned from R&L shortly thereafter.'0
After his resignation, Bibeau, in defiance of the non-
competition clause contained in the buyout agreement with
McFarland, immediately began soliciting R&L customers.1 At the
same time, Brier founded CSI to compete directly with R&L and
immediately hired Bibeau. 12 Bibeau then filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island where he sought a determination that the non-
competition clause in the buyout agreement was void. 13 While this
matter was pending before the district court, CSI contacted First
Bank (Bank), a predecessor in interest to Washington Trust, in
reference to obtaining a loan.14 The events surrounding the loan
application were the basis of the Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Washing-
ton Trust Company of Westerly litigation.
R&L and McFarland alleged that when the Bank was in the
process of determining whether to make a loan to CSI it used con-
fidential financial information concerning R&L's business opera-
tions.15 The Bank obtained this information from Bibeau and Brier
when Bibeau had applied for a loan to finance his buyout of
6. Id. at 608.
7. Id. at 607.
8. Id. at 608.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Washington Trust Co. of Westerly, C.A.
No. PC99-2859, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 181,*4 (R.I. Super. Dec. 13, 2002).
13. See id. In February 1996, the District Court issued a preliminary in-
junction barring Bibeau from soliciting two of Read & Lundy's customers. Id.
n.2.
14. See id at *5.
15. Read & Lundy, Inc., 840 A.2d at 1101.
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R&L. 16 Despite being aware of the rather contentious relationship
between Brier and Bibeau and R&L and McFarland, the Bank
granted CSI a five-hundred thousand dollar loan. 17 In March of
1996, R&L and McFarland filed the aforementioned McFarland v.
Brier action, where after prolonged litigation, they ultimately pre-
vailed and were awarded substantial damages.' 8 However, it ap-
pears that R&L and McFarland never collected any of this award
from Bibeau, CSI, Brier, or his accounting firm.19
R&L and McFarland then brought suit against Washington
Trust in June 1999, where they alleged that the Bank: (1)
breached its implied contract with them not to use Read &
Lundy's confidential business information in its consideration of a
competing customer's loan; (2) tortiously interfered with the con-
tractual relations between them and Brier, Bibeau, CSI, and their
customers; (3) civilly conspired with Brier, Bibeau, and CSI to vio-
late the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; and (4) violated the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.20 Believing that R&L and McFarland's action
was driven by their inability to collect the judgment rendered
against Bibeau, Brier, his accounting firm, or CSI,21 Washington
Trust moved for summary judgment in August 2002 following pre-
trial discovery. 22 The trial justice granted Washington Trust's mo-
tion for summary judgment in full and R&L and McFarland ap-
pealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
1. Breach of Contract
On appeal, R&L and McFarland argued that the parties had
mutually agreed that the financial information supplied to the
Bank in connection with Bibeau's attempted buyout of R&L from
16. Id.
17. See Read & Lundy, Inc., C.A. No. PC99-2859, 2002 R.I. Super. Lexis
181 at *5. It should be noted that the loan did contain a covenant that CSI
would not solicit customers of Read & Lundy. Id. at *5-6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *6 n.3.
20. Read & Lundy, Inc., 840 A.2d at 1101.
21. See Read & Lundy Inc., C.A. No. PC99-2859, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS
181 at *6 n.3.
22. See id at *7.
23. Read & Lundy Inc., 840 A.2d at 1101.
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McFarland would not be used beyond the consideration of Bibeau's
loan application.24 The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected this
claim and affirmed the motion justice's grant of summary judg-
ment on R&L and McFarland's breach of contract claim, stating
that "[a]n essential element to the formulation of any true con-
tract is an 'intent to contract."' 25 More specifically, the court noted
there was simply no evidence indicating that the parties had ever
considered what would happen to the information after it was
provided to the Bank.26 Additionally, the court adopted the propo-
sition that absent an agreement to the contrary, a bank does not
violate any legal duty when it uses information provided by one
customer in deciding whether to lend money to another prospec-
tive borrower. 27
2. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
In reviewing the motion justice's grant of summary judgment
of R&L's and McFarland's claim for tortious interference with con-
tractual relations, the court reestablished that a successful cause
of action requires proof of: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the
alleged wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; (3) the wrongdoer's
intentional interference; and (4) damages.2 Although it did not de-
finitively state which elements R&L and McFarland failed to es-
tablish, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the motion
justice's ruling.29 The court seemingly was focused on the "dam-
age" element, stating that R&L and McFarland failed to demon-
strate any connection between the alleged loss of profits that they
sought to recover and the Bank's action in lending money to CSI.30
The court further suggested that there was no evidence that the
Bank had intended to harm R&L and McFarland, thus making
summary judgment of this claim appropriate. 31
24. Id. at 1101-02.
25. Id. at 1102 (citing Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414, 417 (R.I. 1969)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1102 (citing Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901,
906 (R.I. 2002)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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3. Civil Conspiracy
As for the civil conspiracy claim, the court held that R&L and
McFarland needed to show evidence of an unlawful enterprise.32
However, the court also noted that since civil conspiracy was not
an independent basis of liability, a valid underlying intentional
tort theory was required. 33 Yielding to the judgment of the trial
justice, the court affirmed summary judgment of this claim for
primarily two reasons.34 First, the court noted that R&L and
McFarland failed to establish an underlying intentional tort the-
ory upon which the civil conspiracy claim was based.35 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that R&L and McFarland produced no
evidence indicating that the Bank had conspired to harm them or
engaged in any other misconduct. 36
4. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Finally, R&L and McFarland claimed that the motion justice
erred in concluding that their claim for violation of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was time-barred. 37 However, after re-
viewing the deposition testimony of a Bank officer taken in Janu-
ary 1996, the court ultimately rejected this argument as well. 38
More particularly, it noted that during the deposition the officer
had testified that the Bank had kept information concerning R&L
in its loan file for CSI for comparison purposes. 39 Thus, the court
reasoned that R&L and McFarland had been on notice since at
least January 1996 that the Bank was possibly using its informa-
tion to consider CSI's loan request, but failed to file suit until June
1999.40 Therefore, because the three-year statute of limitations for
a UTSA claim would have expired in January 1999,41 the court
32. Id. (citing ERI Max Entertainment, Inc. v. Streisand, 690 A.2d 1351,
1354 (R.I. 1997)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-41-6 (Supp. 2004) (prescribing a three-year
statute of limitations for UTSA claims that commences to run when the
claimant discovers or should discovered the misappropriation).
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held that the trial justice appropriately ruled that R&L and
McFarland's claim was time-barred. 42
COMMENTARY
This case presented the Rhode Island Supreme Court with an
issue of first impression, mainly whether a bank may internally
use the information in one commercial customer's loan application
to consider another customer's loan request. 43 Although the court
clearly held that a bank may use such information in this fashion,
absent an agreement between the bank and the customer, 44 it did
not articulate any rationalization for adopting this rule. The deci-
sion of the trial court, however, did identify several policy argu-
ments in favor of not imposing a common law duty on the part of a
bank to refrain from internally using commercial information from
a customer in its consideration of another customer.45
The trial justice noted that prohibiting a bank from consider-
ing all available information in making its own loan decisions
would create at least two undesirable outcomes. 46 First, it could
have the effect of forcing banks to blindly enter into loan transac-
tions.47 This would be a problematic situation for banks, as they
potentially could violate the duties that they owe to their deposi-
tors and shareholders. 48 The second implication of this result
would be that the free flow of funds being loaned by banks would
be chilled.49 In a broader sense, the trial justice also reasoned that
because banking is so vital to the national economy, the need for
uniformity in regulations affecting banking practices would likely
result in any state common rule imposing such a duty upon banks
being preempted by federal law.50 More specifically, the trial jus-
tice noted that federal law did not prohibit banks from engaging in
the practice question in this case. 51
42. Read & Lundy Inc., 840 A.2d at 1103.
43. Id. at 1102.
44. Id.
45. See Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Washington Trust Co. of Westerly, C.A.
No. PC99-2859, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 181, *19-20 (R.I. Super. Dec. 13,
2002).
46. Id. at *21.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *22.
51. Id. at *22 n.7.
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However, despite these policy considerations cited by the trial
justice in support of rejecting the imposition of a duty, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court did leave open the possibility of recognizing
such a restriction if the bank and customer mutually agreed to it.
While having the option to contractually impose this duty on a
bank certainly provides commercial customers with a method of
protecting their loan information, it would seem unlikely that
banks would be willing to agree to such terms. In a practical
sense, by agreeing to such a restriction, banks would be purposely
exposing themselves to the negative consequences cited by the
trial justice for not imposing an implied duty. Stated differently,
banks essentially would be contracting to enter blindly into other
loan transactions without the benefit of potentially useful infor-
mation which, of course, may potentially cause them to violate the
duties that they owe to their depositors and shareholders. Addi-
tionally, when this concept is considered in light of the fact that
banks, in most situations, will be in a superior bargaining position
over the customer, it seems implausible that a bank would ever
agree to impose such a restriction on itself.
As the noted in the trial justice's opinion, the area of banking
and lending is "archetypically within the domain of legislative
judgment."52 Since the Rhode Island Supreme Court has spoken
on this issue, now may be the time for the state's legislature to
weigh in and "consider the delicate financial issues at stake and
strike a balance between sound economics on the one hand, and
expectations of loyalty on the other."53
CONCLUSION
In the absence of any agreement between a bank and its cus-
tomer providing that the bank will not use any information re-
ceived from the customer in deciding whether to lend money to
another borrower, there is no implied contractual duty on the part
of a bank that restricts the internal use of commercial loan appli-
cation information for such purposes.
Marc A. Antonucci
52. Id. at *22 (quoting Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d
594, 601 (3rd Cir. 1979)).
53. Id.
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Trusts and Estates. Gaspar v. Cordeiro, 843 A.2d 479 (R.I.
2004). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a joint bank ac-
count carries no right of survivorship after one of the tenants to
that bank account dies unless the parties explicitly agree to a
right of survivorship by a signed writing. The court reaffirmed its
language from Robinson v. Delfino, which held that "absence [of a
joint bank account providing survivorship rights] will be conclu-
sive evidence of an intent not to transfer any right of ownership in
the survivor ... ." 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1999, Joseph Cordeiro created two joint bank accounts with
his sister-in-law, Maria F. Gaspar, the defendant.2 It was undis-
puted that the defendant made no contribution to these accounts.
3
At the time the accounts were formed there were no provisions for
a right of survivorship on either the signature cards or the cus-
tomer agreement, both of which were signed by Joseph Cordeiro
and the defendant. 4
Two years after the formation of the bank accounts, the bank
issued a Personal Deposit Account Agreement, which stated that
"[o]n the death of any joint owner, the funds in the Account will
pass to the surviving joint owner."5 Neither Joseph Cordeiro nor
the defendant signed the Personal Deposit Account Agreement.
6
Joseph Cordeiro died in July 2002 and the plaintiffs, Joseph
Cordeiro's sisters-in-law, brought this action on behalf of Cor-
deiro's widow, Alice Cordeiro, seeking a restraining order to block
the defendant from using the funds.7
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was only placed on
the account to assist Joseph Cordeiro in paying his bills, while the
1. 710 A.2d 154, 161 (R.I. 1998).
2. Gaspar v. Cordeiro, 843 A.2d 479, 480 (R.I. 2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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defendant claimed that she had a right of survivorship and the
funds belonged to her.8 Both parties moved for summary judg-
ment.9
Based on the signature cards and customer cards signed in
1999 and the unsigned Personal Deposit Account Agreement later
sent out by the bank, the motion judge granted summary judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, concluding that there was no right of sur-
vivorship.'0
Defendant appealed.1"
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided Robinson v. Delfino
in 1998, overturning a lower court decision ordering the surviving
account-holder of a joint bank account with a right of survivorship
to return funds to the estate of the deceased account-holder.12
The court held both "that the opening of a joint bank account
wherein survivorship rights are specifically provided for is conclu-
sive evidence of the intention to transfer [ownership at death]"13
and that "absence [of a signed agreement granting survivorship
rights] will be conclusive evidence of an intent not to transfer any
right of ownership in the survivor ... "14
By adopting a bright line rule, the court in Robinson sought to
extract itself from the inconsistencies that result when courts are
forced to determine the subjective intent of the deceased joint.15
The court also sought to rescue surviving named joint account-
8. Gaspar, 843 A.2d at 480.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 710 A.2d 154, 161(R.I. 1998).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 159. The court quoted Wright v. Bloom, 635 N.E.2d 31(Ohio 1994), which stated:
Recent cases have created a morass of unpredictability, often occa-
sioned by ambiguous and conflicting results. Presently, the depositor
cannot rest assured as to whether the funds remaining in the ac-
count at his death will immediately pass to the survivor. Identical
survivorship language expressly set forth in one joint and survivor-
ship account agreement may be adjudged sufficient to pass owner-
ship to the survivor while found to be insufficient in another.
Id. at 33.
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holders from "the necessity of first having to travel through sev-
eral court systems and to have lawyers, trial judges, juries, and
appellate judges perform post mortem cerebral autopsies in order
to determine and second guess what the subjective intent of the
deceased joint-owner of the account was at the time the account
was created." 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The holding in Robinson stands for the idea that the court will
look to whether the written agreement creating the joint bank ac-
count contains a right of survivorship as the sole evidence of the
deceased joint account-holder's intent.17 Robinson does not stand
for the idea that the intent of the deceased account-holder is un-
important,18 nor does it stand for the idea that all joint bank ac-
counts give rise to a right of survivorship. 19
The defendant in Gaspar relied on the Personal Deposit Ac-
count Agreement sent out by the bank years after Joseph Cordeiro
and the defendant signed the customer agreement and signature
cards at the opening of the account as evidence that a right of sur-
vivorship existed,20 but neither Joseph Cordeiro nor the defendant
ever expressed intent to be bound to the later agreement with a
signature. 21
The allegation by the plaintiffs that Joseph Cordeiro's intent
when he opened the joint bank account was to facilitate bill paying
was equally meaningless. 22 The only issue was whether or not Jo-
seph Cordeiro explicitly provided for a right to survivorship.
Although the Robinson court in its reasoning stated that "the
absolute common understanding of the vast majority of people es-
tablishing joint bank accounts nowadays is that they create im-
mediate possessory as well as survivorship rights,"23 that
statement merely indicates that, where a right of survivorship ex-
ists in the bank's customer agreement, the court is justified in
16. Robinson, 710 A.2d at 160.
17. Id. at 161.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Gaspar v. Cordeiro, 843 A.2d 479, 480 (R.I. 2004).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Robinson, 710 A.2d at 160
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presuming the deceased account-holder understood it was there. 24
It does not create a right of survivorship where none existed in the
agreement itself.25
CONCLUSION
In Gaspar v. Cordeiro the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
to both the spirit and letter of its decision in Robinson. The court
will not delve into the vagaries of trying to determine the intent of
the deceased account-holder, nor will it create intent where none
is expressed. The court simply looks to the signed agreement and
the presence or absence of the survivorship rights in that docu-
ment is determinative.
Thomas Connolly
24. See id. at 161.
25. See Id.
2004 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 198. An Act Relating to Health and
Safety - Rhode Island Workers' Safety Act of 2004. Establishes a
ban on smoking in public places. However, the act does provide for
the maintenance of designated smoking and non-smoking areas in
certain "pari-mutual" facilities, which feature "gaming areas."
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 204. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Assaults. When serious bodily injury is the proximate
result of criminal negligence, the person who committed the act
shall be guilty of battery, a felony, and be eligible for
imprisonment for up to ten years, and fines up to ten-thousand
dollars, or both. The chapter defines criminally negligent behavior
as behavior which is incompatible with a proper regard for human
life or indifferent to consequences.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 311. An Act Relating to Unfair Sales
Practices. Prohibits any business from requiring a consumer to
provide his or her social security number on an application for a
discount card. Prohibits the sale or transfer of any personal
information obtained through the application for such discount
cards to any third party.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 313. An Act Relating to Real Estate
Sales Disclosures. Requires the seller of real estate to disclose to
the buyer and any party involved in the transaction any known
encroachments or legally existing easements on the property.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 343. An Act Relating to Human
Services - Health Care for Working with Disabilities. Authorizes
the department of human services to establish a Medicaid buy-in
program pursuant to the "Balanced Budget Act of 1997" to assist
disabled individuals in entering and reentering the work force.
Provides health care and social services to disabled individuals by
allowing them to purchase Medicaid coverage that is necessary to
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enable such individuals to continue their employment activity.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 356. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles - Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004. Prohibits
state and municipal law enforcement officers and agencies from
participating in any activities of racial profiling. Racial profiling is
broadly defined in this chapter as any disparate treatment of any
individual based on, in whole or in part, the ethnic or racial status
of that individual. Establishes a civil cause of action for the victim
of such treatment and includes a possible award of reasonable
attorneys' fees.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 371. An Act Relating to Businesses and
Professions - Pharmacies. Includes special provisions to regulate
licensed Canadian pharmacies that ship or transport
pharmaceutical products into the state. Provides that if the
ownership or location of such a pharmacy should change the
original license will become immediately null and void.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 393. An Act Relating to Education -
Education Equity and Property Tax Relief Establishes a joint
legislative committee to develop a basic foundation support
program and an appropriate transition plan to fully implement a
new funding system requiring an equitable division of resources
among the state's school districts. This committee will be assisted
by an appointed foundation aid technical advisory group and a
property tax relief technical advisory group.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 400. An Act Relating to Administrative
Procedures. Gives responsibility to the governor's office and
economic development corporation to determine whether any
particular rule propounded by an agency may adversely affect a
small business. The economic development corporation will act as
advocate for the small business, notifying the relevant agency of
any adverse affects on any business after making determinations
of costs, benefits, alternatives, as well as other factors. This
chapter also requires each agency to review all existing agency
rules every five years to determine what, if any changes need be
made. Amends Rhode Island General Laws sections 42-35-1, 42-
35-3 and 42-35-15.
SURVEY SECTION
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 443. An Act Relating to Elections.
Amends Rhode Island General Laws section 17-25-10.1 entitled
"Rhode Island Campaign Contributions and Expenditures
Reporting" to permit campaign contributions to be made via credit
card or internet transaction in addition to check, money order or
cash contributions of less than twenty-five dollars as long as
mandatory reporting procedures are followed.
2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 453. An Act Relating to Health -
Defibrillators. Requires licensed health clubs to maintain at least
one "automated external defibrillator" which is accessible to staff
and guests, and to ensure that at least one employee who is
trained in the proper use of such defibrillators be present on each
working shift. A civil cause of action arising out of the use of a
defibrillator in a health club does not exist unless the claim
involves the failure to use the device, or wanton and willful
negligence.
20051

